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CHAPTER I 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Like other fields of science, most of fundamental economic theories characterize an ideal 
frictionless economy abstracted from the complexity of the real world. Although they help us 
understand the quintessence of the economics, one must not simply ignore the important 
consequences of various frictions in the classical economic models. Search and informational 
frictions are among the ones that attracts a number of economists. 
The alleviation of search frictions is among the crucial roles for money as a medium of 
exchange. In Chapter II, we investigate how the introduction of money would improve the 
technology choice problem in a search-theoretic model. Chapter III illustrates a new asset 
pricing approach in an economy with heterogeneous prior beliefs, where the stock prices may 
deviate from the expected fundamental values, and speculators can make profits from stock price 
manipulations provided the presence of informational frictions. An empirical wavelet analysis of 
stock market comovements in Chapter IV reveals some features of the informational spillovers 
from NASDAQ and S&P500 to some Eastern Asian markets. 
 
1.1 Search Frictions and Technology Choice in a 
Monetary Economy 
It is well known that the existence of search frictions in trade gives birth to fiat money. The 
path-breaking work by Kiyotaki and Wright (1989, 1991, and 1993) vividly illustrates this 
process within a random-matching framework. By alleviating the "double coincidence of wants" 
problem in a barter economy, the introduction of money as a medium of exchange greatly 
facilitates the trade and hence foster faster economic development. 
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Although there is a growing literature on the role of money in search equilibrium, few of 
them emphasize another associated but distinct problem: the effect of search frictions on 
technology choice and the role of money in this aspect. The separation of the beneficiaries and 
cost bearers of the goods, a direct impact from specialization, would distort the producers' 
technology choice in the presence of severe search frictions, especially in a decentralized trading 
environment. When the expected waiting period between trades is too long, the time cost for 
rejecting low-quality goods and waiting for a better one will be unaffordable. When the 
acceptability is independent on the quality of the goods, producers are likely to choose the 
low-cost technology, even when it is socially suboptimal. 
Attribute to the introduction of money into the economy, search frictions in trading are 
considerably mitigated, which reduces the time costs for being selective about the quality of 
goods. As demonstrated in Chapter II, if the search frictions are low enough to grant the 
premium goods higher acceptability than the low-quality ones, producers are more likely to 
choose the high technology. As a consequence, it is easier to restore first-best technology 
choices in a monetary economy than in a pure barter economy. The result is robust in both the 
simplified case with instantaneous production and the more realistic non-instantaneous 
production scenario. 
 
1.2  Asset Pricing with Informational Frictions 
Even in a more developed economy, the presence of informational frictions may still have 
an important impact on individual behavior and equilibrium outcomes. In Chapter III, we 
introduce a heterogeneous agents framework to study how the market price of an asset may 
deviate from their fundamental values as long as one or two decades, and how the informational 
frictions may lead to profitable speculative manipulations via signal distortions. 
Note that the general equilibrium framework proposed in Chapter III is among the first few 
efforts in exploring approaches toward the computation of markets prices in an economy with 
heterogeneous prior beliefs, where the asset pricing formulas based on representative agent 
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framework only suggest asset valuations to each investor. Owing to the assumed heterogeneity, 
the expected market prices are likely to differ from the expected asset values, and the 
discrepancies must be priced when the agents are active in stock transactions and/or portfolio 
adjustments. Hence, the market price contains a non-fundament component, which explains the 
deviation from the corresponding expected fundamental values. 
On the basis of our proposed heterogeneous agents framework, speculators may bid up the 
stock prices in a market with informational frictions, pretending that they receive better signals 
than what they really have. Subsequent investors would be misinformed and raise the stock 
prices accordingly. Signal distortions emerging from some market traits, such as the price 
fluctuation limits, can reduce the cost of speculative biddings and thus make this kind of price 
manipulation profitable. As a result, we can justify some speculations within our proposed 
framework. 
 
1.3 Wavelet Analysis of Stock Market Comovements 
Due to informational frictions, the previous performances in one stock market could be 
regarded as important signals to investors in another stock market. This kind of information 
spillover is crucial for the understanding of financial contagion. In Chapter IV, we investigate 
the pattern of stock market comovements across time scales empirically with the help of wavelet 
analysis. 
While it is difficult to control all the linear and/or non-linear impacts from fundamental 
factors, wavelet analysis provides an alternative approach. After employing wavelet filters to 
decompose the time series of stock indices over time scales, we can disentangle high frequency 
components from the low frequency ones. Based on the belief that long-run effects from 
fundamental factors are mostly captured by low frequency components, we can have a better 
idea about how the non-fundamental factors would influence stock market comovements in the 
short run. 
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The study on stock markets in US, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China 
provides interesting empirical patterns of comovements among them across the time scales. First, 
we find the level of comovements varies across the time scales, while short-run wavelet 
correlation coefficients are significantly positive among open and/or semi-open markets. This 
suggests that there exist some short-run comovements mostly generated by non-fundamental 
factors. 
Secondly, the markets sharing similar fundamental factors comove more substantially in 
the long run, implying that fundamentals (in a broad sense) are still the central piece of stock 
prices. 
Thirdly, market openness matters. Open and semi-open markets in Japan, Hong Kong and 
Taiwan are quite sensitive to the US markets at the monthly to quarterly level, while the 
essentially closed Chinese mainland markets are literally uncorrelated with most of the other 
markets. Moreover, the level of short-run comovements seems increasing in the degree of 
market openness. 
Finally, our results are robust in the sense that the comovement patterns computed based 
on measures of non-linear interdependence, such as Kendall's tau and Spearman's rho, are 
qualitatively similar to those suggested by the linear dependence measure (i.e. correlation 
coefficient). 
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CHAPTER II 
 
MONEY, TECHNOLOGY CHOICE AND 
PATTERN OF EXCHANGE IN 
SEARCH EQUILIBRIUM1 
 
“When the division of labour has been once thoroughly established, it is but a very 
small part of a man's wants which the produce of his own labour can supply. He supplies the 
far greater part of them by exchanging that surplus part of the produce of his own labour, 
which is over and above his own consumption, for such parts of the produce of other men's 
labour as he has occasion for.” (Adam Smith, The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter IV, 
paragraph 1) 
 
2.1 Introduction 
In this paper, we develop a search-theoretic framework to study how money in a 
decentralized trading environment may affect technology choice and decentralized exchange 
patterns in the presence of trade frictions. Since the seminal work of Kiyotaki and Wright 
(1989,1991,1993), there has been a growing literature on money in search equilibrium, 
emphasizing that the use of a medium of exchange minimizes the time/resource costs associated 
with searching for exchange opportunities, hence alleviating the "double coincidence of wants" 
problem with barter.2 While the study of the role of money in facilitating trade has generated 
considerable insights towards understanding the origin and use of money, its roles in promoting 
higher production technology remain largely unexplored. 
                                                 
1 This Chapter is based on the joint work with Ping Wang and Haibin Wu.  
2 The literature of barter versus money with a formal model of exchange is pioneered by Jones (1976). In the prototypical search 
model of money following Kiyotaki and Wright, exchange is characterized by one-for-one swaps of goods and money, implying 
fixed prices, under which the optimal inflation issue can be studied using the arguments by Li (1995). Extensions of the 
Kiyotaki-Wright model with divisible goods but indivisible money to include pricing include Trejos and Wright (1995) and Shi 
(1995). More recent attempts to characterize pricing behavior and the distribution of cash permit divisible goods and money. For 
a brief survey, the reader is referred to Rupert, Schindler and Wright (2001, footnote 1) and papers cited therein. 
Diﬀerent from the canonical Walrasian monetary growth models, the search-theoretic
framework allows us to provide a deep structure to help understand more clearly how
money aﬀects technology choice in decentralized trade.3 Under this setup, we can inquire
(i) whether the presence of trade frictions grants the high technology disadvantageous and
(ii) whether money encourages adoption of the high technology. In particular, our paper
models explicitly the production process of quality-diﬀerentiated goods in a way that
enables low-quality goods to be produced and traded in equilibrium even under perfect
observability of goods quality. Money, by improving decentralized trades, can mitigate
the high technology’s cost-disadvantage and hence encourage the implementation of a
more advanced technology. Our paper therefore provides a plausible channel through
which money can generate a real eﬀect via technology choice.
More specifically, we consider a continuous-time search and random-matching model
with three groups of agents: producers, goods traders and money traders. For tractability,
both goods and money are indivisible, and each non-producing agent has only one unit of
space to store either goods or money. There are two clusters of goods: high quality and
low quality, with each cluster consisting of a continuum of varieties. While high quality
goods yield greater consumption values, they incur a production time delay and a greater
production resource cost. At any point in time, each producer must choose between the
two technologies and can only produce one unit of the good of a particular type. Upon
a successful production, a producer becomes a goods trader with a commodity of a
particular quality. The quality of goods is public information to all traders. Each buyer
consumes only a subset of varieties, exclusive of those self-produced, and forms a best
response to accepting goods of diﬀerent quality within the desired subset.
The way through which money influences technology choice can be illustrated intu-
itively. Since the deepening of specialization entails some time for a consumer to buy
the output from a producer, we have to consider the inventory costs incurred. If the use
of money can save consumers’ transactions time to search for desired commodities, the
time costs of inventories can be reduced. This makes the high technology’s disadvantage
3Our paper is thus in sharp contrast with the ad hoc setup of money-in-the-production-function. Also
note that in the canonical Walrasian frameworks, it is diﬃcult to illustrate how search frictions would
aﬀect the acceptability of goods with diﬀerent quailities. In contrast, the search-theoretic framework
performs well in this regard.
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in manufacturing and time delay costs less significant, thus creating an intensive margin
in favor of the high technology. Since only producers take into account the underlying
inventory costs, this transactions time eﬀect becomes more important when production
takes longer time. In conducting the welfare analysis, we employ the autarky technol-
ogy choice as the benchmark. Note that in the absence of search frictions, producers’
first-best technology choice is the same as their autarky counterparts, which may thus
be referred to as autarky eﬃciency.4 It is in this regard that the good produced by the
high technology is never the worse good in terms of consumer’s valuation. The presence
of search frictions distorts the producer’s technology choice and by comparing this with
the first-best outcome in a frictionless economy, we can then investigate whether the
introduction of money can restore the eﬃcient technology choice outcome.
A principal contribution of our paper to the existing literature on money and product
quality is that low quality goods may be produced and traded in equilibrium without
relying on incomplete information. In particular, we establish the possible coexistence
of two locally stable pure and one locally unstable mixed strategy equilibria with active
trade, depending on the society’s initial endowment of money. By examining equilib-
rium and welfare outcomes, we obtain the following properties. First, when production
is instantaneous, the mixed strategy equilibrium, if it coexists with the pure strategy
high-technology equilibrium, is Pareto-dominated, and features a positive relationship
between the fraction of high technology producers and the society’s endowment of money.
Moreover, autarky eﬃciency is both suﬃcient and necessary for the high technology equi-
librium to Pareto dominate the low technology one. Second, when production takes time,
the high technology equilibrium has higher level of social welfare than the low one if, in
addition to autarky eﬃciency, the high technology’s delay cost is not too large and the
social endowment of money is suﬃciently high. The introduction of money aﬀects pro-
ducers’ technology choice, by mitigating the high technology’s disadvantage in production
time delay. Finally, by deriving the optimal quantity of money under each equilibrium,
we identify an important source of social ineﬃciency caused by search frictions that can
lead to an under-investment in the advanced technology in decentralized equilibrium.
4The reader should be warned that the term “autarky eﬃciency” is referred to technology choice
rather than the pattern of exchange.
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Literature Review
In the money search literature, there are papers considering two types of traded
goods, including Williamson and Wright (1994), Kim (1996), Berentsen and Rocheteau
(2004), and Trejos (1997, 1999). However, in these models, the low quality good is
always undesirable under perfect observability, as it is costless to produce and generates
no consumption value, compared to a high quality good yielding a strictly positive net
utility gain. In order for both goods to be traded, private information about the goods
quality is therefore assumed. In contrast, our paper shows the possibility of producing low
quality goods in equilibrium even under perfect observability of goods quality by modelling
more explicitly the process of production of the two quality-diﬀerentiated goods, thus
complementing previous studies by proposing an alternative and plausible underlying
driving force that permits low-quality goods to be produced and traded in equilibrium.
There is a small but growing literature studying money and technology choice in
search equilibrium. The first branch of this literature considers endogenous choice of the
horizontal scopes of production specialization in the absence of quality diﬀerentiation. In
Shi (1997), agents can produce desired goods at a higher cost than those for trade. Money
enhances decentralized trade and thus creates a gain from specialization. A similar eﬀect
is considered by Reed (1998) where there is a trade-oﬀ between devoting time to trade
and to maintaining production skills. Recently, Camera, Reed and Waller (2003) allow
agents to choose whether to be a “jack of all trade” or a “master of one” in which money
again advances individuals’ specialization in a decentralized trading environment. In
Laing, Li and Wang (2003), a multiple-matching framework is developed where trade
frictions manifest themselves in limited consumption variety and via a positive feedback
between shopping and work eﬀort decisions, money creation may have a positive eﬀect
on productive activity.
The second branch, to which our paper belongs, analyzes the endogenous choice be-
tween vertically diﬀerentiated production technologies under a given scope of specializa-
tion. The only previous study to our knowledge is by Kim and Yao (2001) who introduce
money into a search model with divisible and heterogeneous goods. In their paper,
production is instantaneous, the focus is exclusively on the mixed strategy equilibrium,
whereas the proportions of high and low technology producers are exogenously given. In
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contrast, our paper considers the more general case of non-instantaneous production to
allow for diﬀerent production time under diﬀerent technologies and examines both mixed
and pure strategy equilibria, by maintaining the simplifying assumption of indivisible
goods. Moreover, we allow money traders to determine whether they would accept either
type or both types of goods and, as a consequence, the proportion of producers using
high/low technology is endogenous. Furthermore, we study the welfare implications under
various equilibria and with diﬀerent initial social endowment of money.
2.2 The Basic Model
The basic structure extends that of Kiyotaki and Wright (1993). Time is continuous.
There are a continuum of infinitely-lived agents whose population is normalized to one.
Based on their activities, agents are divided into three diﬀerent categories at any point in
time: producers, goods traders and money traders. Both goods and money are indivisible.
Each non-producing agent has only one unit of space that may be used to store either a
unit of commodity or a unit of money.
There are two groups of goods: high quality (type-H) and low quality (type-L). Each
group consists of a continuum of varieties whose characteristic location can be indexed
on a unit circumference. At any point in time, each producer can produce only one unit
of the good of a particular type. Upon producing a commodity, a producer becomes a
goods trader instantaneously. Thus, producers can be classified as type-H or type-L, as
are goods traders. The type of agents (and hence the quality of goods) is assumed to be
public information to all traders.
Money is storable but cannot be consumed or produced. At the beginning of time,
there are M ∈ (0, 1) units of money in the economy, so we have a measure of M money
traders due to the unit-storage-space assumption. Thus, letting N0, NH , NL, and Nm,
respectively, be the measures of producers, type-H goods traders, type-L goods traders,
and money traders,5 population identity implies:
Nm +NH +NL +N0 = 1 (2.1)
5Due to the assumption of unit storage space and the indivisibility of money, Nm =M .
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The proportion of type-H goods traders to all goods traders, denoted h, and the fraction
of money traders to all traders, denoted µ, can thus be expressed as:
h =
NH
NH +NL
(2.2)
µ =
Nm
Nm +NH +NL
=
M
1−N0
. (2.3)
Traders match with each other according to a Poisson process characterized by the
arrival rate parameter, β. Because that the probability for a particular pair of traders
to rematch is zero in our continuum economy and that no authority exists to enforce
the repayment of credits or IOU’s, sellers must accept money in the absence of double
coincidence of wants. Throughout the main text of the paper, we follow Trejos (1997)
and Kim and Yao (2001) to focus exclusively on pure monetary equilibrium, that is,
barter exchanges are not allowed in the basic framework. A discussion of the pure barter
economy is relegated to Appendix.
2.2.1 Production Technology
There are two types of technologies. The high technology can produce a unit of the high
quality good at a (utility) cost of ε, while the low technology incurs a lower manufacturing
cost of δε (with 0 < δ < 1) to produce one unit of the low quality good.
The two technologies also diﬀer in the arrival rates of the respective outputs. Specif-
ically, the product arrival of the low technology follows a Poisson process with arrival
rate of α, while that of the high technology has an arrival rate of ηα (with 0 < η < 1).
2.2.2 Preferences
Following the convention of the money-search literature, we assume that no agent would
consume the good he or she produces. Moreover, each agent gains positive utility only
by consuming a subset of the varieties of each type (called a consumable set), whose
measure is denoted by x. Thus, x can be regarded as a taste specialization index.
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Type-H Type-L
Utility from consumption U θU
Production cost ε δε
Output arrival rate ηα α
(0 < θ, δ, η < 1)
Table 2.1: Key Parameters of Technologies and Preferences
Despite their taste heterogeneity, all agents have identical utility functional forms.
While the consumption of the first unit of a high quality good within the consumable set
yields a utility U > 0, any additional unit at a given point in time would not generate
any extra value. Similarly, the consumption of the first unit of a low quality good within
the consumable set gives a utility of θU (with 0 < θ < 1). The key technology and
preference parameters are summarized in Table 2.1.
To ensure non-trivial technological choice, we impose:
Assumption 1: U > θU > ε > δε.
That is, both types of products deliver positive net values to the economy. The assump-
tion of θU > ε guarantees the existence of mixed strategy equilibrium, as we will show
later.
2.2.3 Value Functions
Denote the probability with which a money trader will accept type-i goods as πi (i =
H,L), and Πi as the average probability of acceptability in the economy (which is taken
as parametrically given by all individual traders). Denote the discount rate by r. Further
denote Vi as the asset value of a type-i agent, where i = 0, H, L,m represents producers,
type-H goods traders, type-L goods traders, and money traders, respectively.
We are now well equipped to set up the Bellman equations, displayed for simplicity
by assuming steady states (as in the conventional money and search literature):
rV0 = max{α(VL − V0 − δε), ηα(VH − V0 − ε)} (2.4)
rVi = βµxΠi(Vm − Vi), i = H,L (2.5)
11
rVm = β(1−µ)x
∙
hmax
πH
{πH(U + V0 − Vm)}+ (1− h)max
πL
{πL(θU + V0 − Vm)}
¸
. (2.6)
Equation (2.4) states that the flow value of a producer is the maximum incremental value,
over the two technologies, from the producer state to the goods trader state net of the
corresponding production cost, upon a successful arrival of the product (measured by α
and ηα, respectively).
Recall that with a flow probability β, a type-i goods trader can meet another trader
who will be a money trader with probability µ. The chance for this money trader to like
the goods trader’s product is x, which will be accepted with probability Πi. Thus, as
indicated by (2.5), the flow value of a type-i goods trader is the incremental value from
exchanging the product for money, which is the diﬀerential, Vm − Vi, multiplied by the
flow probability, βµxΠi.
Similarly, the flow probability for a money trader to meet a type-H goods trader
whose commodity is within the consumable set is β(1− µ)xh and that to meet a type-L
goods trader is β(1− µ)x(1− h). The flow value of meeting a type-i goods trader is the
flow utility (U and θU , for i = H,L, respectively) plus the incremental value from the
money trader state to the producer state (V0 − Vm). A money trader may stay put (by
not accepting the good, i.e., πi = 0) or accept the trade with probability πi > 0 (which
is the best response by the money trader, possibly less than one). Thus, this flow value
must be multiplied by the corresponding acceptance probability, as displayed in (2.6).
It is convenient to define by ∆i (i = H,L) the producer’s eﬀective discount factors
over the expected span of the production process and by ρi (i = H,L) the goods trader’s
eﬀective discount factors for the expected waiting period for sales.
∆H ≡
ηα
ηα+ r
; ∆L ≡
α
α+ r
(2.7)
ρH ≡
βµxΠH
βµxΠH + r
; ρL ≡
βµxΠL
βµxΠL + r
. (2.8)
Given the Poisson process, 1ηα is the average waiting time for production and
r
ηα is
the discount rate over the expected span of the production process , thus yielding the
producer’s eﬀective discount factors, ∆H . Similar explanations apply to ∆L, ρH and ρL.
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Accordingly, we can rewrite the value functions (2.4) and (2.5) in a cleaner manner,
rV0 = max{∆L(VL − δε),∆H(VH − ε)} (2.9)
Vi = ρiVm, i = H,L. (2.10)
2.3 Equilibria with Instantaneous Production
We begin by considering a special case with instantaneous production (α → ∞), which
enables a complete analytic analysis of the steady-state monetary equilibrium. With
instantaneous production, we have N0 = 0, and , from (2.3), µ = M . Moreover, (2.7)
implies ∆H = ∆L = 1 and hence (2.9) can be rewritten as:
V0 = max{(VL − δε), (VH − ε)}. (2.11)
2.3.1 Money Trader’s Best Response
To solve the equilibrium under instantaneous production, first consider the money traders.
A money trader’s best responses πH and πL are determined according to the following:
πH
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
= 0, if U + V0 − Vm < 0
∈ (0, 1), if U + V0 − Vm = 0
= 1, if U + V0 − Vm > 0
(2.12)
πL
⎧
⎪⎪⎨
⎪⎪⎩
= 0, if θU + V0 − Vm < 0
∈ (0, 1), if θU + V0 − Vm = 0
= 1, if θU + V0 − Vm > 0
. (2.13)
Thus, in the case of U + V0 − Vm = 0 or θU + V0 − Vm = 0, the corresponding best
response (πH or πL) constitutes a mixed strategy.
In equilibrium, the individual’s best response agrees with the average behavior in the
economy, that is,
πi = Πi, (2.14)
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for i = H,L.
2.3.2 Existence
We focus on the case of nondegenerate equilibrium in which all agents in the economy
participate in trade actively. Thus, a producer must have positive payoﬀ,
max{(VL − δε), (VH − ε)} > 0 (2.15)
Moreover, a money trader must buy at least one type of the commodities. This is valid
under the following active equilibrium condition:
max{U + V0 − Vm, θU + V0 − Vm} > 0 (2.16)
The strict inequality is required in order to ensure the validity of condition (2.15).
Since θ < 1, this condition requires U + V0 − Vm > 0, and thus πH = 1, which means
the money trader will fully accept the type-H goods. Based on the three diﬀerent best
responses towards the acceptability of the type-L goods, we can have three equilibria:
(A) πAL = 0; (B) π
B
L ∈ (0, 1); and (C) πCL = 1. We use superscript A, B, and C to denote
each equilibrium whenever it is necessary. Also, we can define the eﬀective discount
factor for the purchasing period (when always accepting a good) as:
ρm ≡
β(1− µ)x
β(1− µ)x+ r . (2.17)
It is not diﬃcult to solve the asset values (V0, VH , VL, Vm) from the linear equation
system (2.6), (2.10) and (2.11), and the solutions are summarized in Table 2.2. We can
interpret the solutions intuitively with the eﬀective discount factors defined in (2.8) and
(2.17). In equilibrium A, for example, the producer bears the manufacturing cost instan-
taneously but should wait for both the selling and purchasing periods, so his utility in
one production cycle is ρHρmU−ε. Since the eﬀective discount factor for one production
cycle is ρHρm, the summation of infinite geometric series yields the solution in the first
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Equilibrium A Equilibrium B Equilibrium C
V0
ρAHρ
A
mU − ε
1− ρAHρAm
ρBHθU − ε
1− ρBH
, or
ρBLθU − δε
1− ρBL
ρCLρ
C
mθU − δε
1− ρCLρCm
VH
ρAHρ
A
m(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
ρBH(θU − ε)
1− ρBH
V CL
VL 0
ρBL (θU − δε)
1− ρBL
ρCLρ
C
m(θU − δε)
1− ρCHρCm
Vm
ρAm(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
θU − ε
1− ρBH
, or
θU − δε
1− ρBL
ρCm(θU − δε)
1− ρCLρCm
ΠL 0 πBL 1
h 1 hB 0
M Sa SB SC
Table 2.2: Solutions for the Instantaneous production Case
cell in Table 2.2, where other cells can be derived in an analogous fashion.6
Utilizing these asset values, we next turn to deriving the best responses of the agents
and checking the corresponding conditions on the parameters. Define Q ≡ (βx+r)rε
β2x2(U−ε) and
impose:
Assumption 2: Qmax
½
δU − δε
θU − δε, 1
¾
<
1
4
.
Assumption 3:
1
θU − ε +
θ
1− θ <
βx
r
.
We first examine the two pure strategy equilibria (A and C). In equilibrium A, no
producer would choose the low technology since it yields negative flow value to producers
(h = 1). We can show from (2.8) and (2.10) that VL = 0. From (2.13), we know that
πL = 0, if θU + V0 − Vm < 0, or, θU < ρAMU − (1− ρAM)V0, as VM = ρAM(U + V0) when
the high technology is chosen. We now define:
M1 ≡ max{1− (βx+ r)(θU − ε)βx(U − ε) , 0} (2.18)
and M2 ≤ 0.5 such that
M2(1−M2) =
(βx+ r)rε
β2x2(U − ε)
, (2.19)
6Note that ρAH , ρ
B
H , and ρ
C
L have the same functional form with respect to µ and exogenous parameters,
so do ρAm and ρ
C
m. However, the argument µ may diﬀer.
15
which has real roots under Assumption 2. We can then establish:
Lemma 1: (Equilibrium A) Equilibrium A exists if SA ≡ (0,M1) ∩ (M2, 1 −M2) =
(M2,min(1 −M2,M1)) 6= ∅ and M ∈ SA, where M ∈ (0,M1) iﬀ θU < ρAMU − (1 −
ρAM)V
A
0 .
Proof. All proofs are in Appendix.
Note that by accepting the type-L goods, a money trader can enjoy the utility of θU .
By rejecting the trade and waiting for type-H goods in the next trade, the money trader
will have the discounted utility, ρAMU , at the cost of delayed production, (1−ρAM)V0. Hence
when M ∈ (0,M1), or equivalently, θU < ρAMU − (1− ρAM)V0, it is a money trader’s best
response to reject a trade with a type-L producer. Intuitively, in an economy swamped
by too much money, money traders would buy any type of goods as soon as possible since
they cannot aﬀord the long waiting period for the second chance. This is particularly
important when the diﬀerence in the quality is not large enough to make the waiting
worthwhile. This eﬀect is due primarily to the presence of search frictions in which too
much money can crowd out the advanced technology. Thus, it may be referred to as the
nonselectivity eﬀect.
The requirement that M ∈ (M2, 1 − M2) is to ensure positive producer payoﬀs.
If the amount of initial money endowment is either too small or too large, then the
probability of successful trades is too low. This transactions cost eﬀect caused by search
frictions implies that no producers would find profitable to use the high technology given
the high manufacturing cost. Thus, if the economy has insuﬃcient amount of money
initially, the introduction of money can serve to mitigate the transactions cost eﬀect and
hence encourage producers to adopt the advanced technology. It may be noted that the
transactions cost eﬀect is also present in Shi (1997), where an insuﬃcient endowment of
money may discourage agents from trading in a decentralized market and instead make
them stay in autarky. By mitigating search frictions, money enlarges the extent of the
market, encouraging horizontal production specialization in Shi (1997) while enhancing
vertical production quality in ours.
The solution of equilibrium C is quite similar to that of equilibrium A. Observe that
when πL = ΠL = 1, equation (2.5) results in V CH = V
C
L , as well as ρ
C
H = ρ
C
L . The
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producer would definitely choose the low technology to minimize his cost, which means
h = 0. After solving for the values, we find that since U > θU > V Cm − V C0 , for any
M ∈ (0, 1), equilibrium C exists as long as V C0 > 0. Define M3 ≤ 1/2 such that
M3(1−M3) =
(U − ε) δQ
θU − δε , (2.20)
which has real roots under Assumption 2. Then we have:
Lemma 2: (Equilibrium C) Equilibrium C exists if M ∈ SC ≡ (M3, 1−M3). Moreover,
SC ⊇ SA if 0 < δ ≤ θ < 1.
Equilibrium B is a bit more complicated. The money trader’s mixed strategy implies
θU + V B0 − V Bm = 0. Based on the fact that the producers are indiﬀerent between the
two technologies, we can solve the money trader’s acceptability of low quality goods,
πBL = Π
B
L ≡ 1−
(1− δ)ε
ρH(θU − δε)
, (2.21)
and the equilibrium proportion of type-H goods in the market,
hB ≡ (βµx+ r)(θU − ε)
β(1− µ)x(1− θ)U . (2.22)
It is easily seen that πBL is increasing in µ and thus M . Moreover, h
B is increasing in µ
and thus M , which implies as the amount of money increases in the economy, there are
more people holding type-H goods. Define,
M4 ≡
rε
βx(θU − ε) , (2.23)
we obtain:
Lemma 3: (Equilibrium B) Equilibrium B exists if SB ≡ (M4,M1) 6= ∅ and M ∈ SB.
Moreover, SB ⊆ SA.
Under Assumptions 2 and 3, Sj 6= ∅ (j = A,B,C) and with the aid of Lemmas 1-3
and Proposition A1 in Appendix, we can establish:
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Proposition 1: (Existence, Stability and Characterization) Under Assumptions 1-3,
a steady-state monetary equilibrium exists, which possesses the following properties, de-
pending on the society’s initial endowment of money M :
(i) πL = 0 with M ∈ SA (equilibrium A);
(ii) πL ∈ (0, 1) with M ∈ SB (equilibrium B);
(iii) πL = 1 with M ∈ SC (equilibrium C).
Moreover, multiple equilibria may arise. Among the three equilibria, equilibrium A and C
are locally stable, while equilibrium B is locally unstable. Furthermore, by mitigating the
transactions cost eﬀect, the introduction of money encourages investment in the advanced
technology and the emergence of equilibrium A. By contrast, only type-L technology will
be chosen in a pure barter economy with instantaneous production.
As to the existence, Assumptions 2 and 3 ensure the nonemptiness of SC and SB,
respectively, whereas both assumptions together guarantee that SA is nonempty. From
Lemma 3, when M ∈ SB, the mixed strategy equilibrium B always co-exists with the
pure strategy equilibrium A (as SB ⊆ SA). Moreover, when 0 < δ ≤ θ < 1, both pure
strategy equilibria co-exist if M ∈ SA (as SA ⊆ SC) while all three types of equilibria
co-exist if M ∈ SB.
The possibility for low quality goods to be produced and traded contributes to the
existing literature on money and product quality in which only high quality goods arise
in equilibrium unless information is asymmetric between buyers and sellers. The co-
existence of these various types of equilibria with active trade is also new to the literature.
Notably, for some given sets of social endowment of money, the equilibrium outcome
is indeterminate where the underlying equilibrium selection mechanism is due entirely
to self-fulfilling prophecies. For example, should a producer expect that traders are
less selective in good quality (animal spirits), he or she would be more inclined toward
employing the low technology. As a result, there will be more traders with low quality
goods and the probability for money holders to locate a high quality good becomes lower.
This implies that money holders would tend to be more generous toward accepting a low
quality good, so the expectations are self-fulfilled.
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The two pure strategy equilibria are both locally stable, since small disturbances
in the acceptability of the type-L goods cannot aﬀect the producer’s choice. However,
equilibrium B is locally unstable. To see this we can simply disturb ΠL. If the agents
believe ΠL to be a bit larger (smaller), VL would be higher (lower). Thus the producer
will prefer the low (high) technology, thereby leading to equilibrium C (A). This is
consistent with the finding in Wright (1999) where mixed strategy equilibria are always
unstable in an evolutionary sense in the search-theoretic model of money with indivisible
goods and indivisible money.
Equilibrium B in our model can be compared with the mixed strategy equilibrium in
Kim and Yao (2001): When both types of products co-exist, the share of type-H goods
(h) and the level of social welfare are increasing in the quantity of money supply (M).
2.3.3 Welfare Implications
Note that in the absence of search frictions, the producers would make the same tech-
nology choice (first-best) as their autarky counterparts, while the existence of search
frictions can distort the producer’s choices. Hence we employ the first best choice as the
benchmark of our welfare analysis, and investigate whether the introduction of money
can reinstall the autarky eﬃciency.
Due to the assumption of instantaneous production, only the goods and money traders
are considered in the commonly used equally weighted steady-state social welfare func-
tion. Observe thatM ∈ [0,M1] is equivalent to V Am > V Bm , which implies V AH > V BH > V BL ,
and V A0 > V
B
0 , pointwise with respect to M . Since S
B ⊆ SA, for any value of M ∈ SB,
there is always an equilibrium with πL = 0 (equilibrium A) that Pareto dominates
the mixed strategy equilibrium. Since this equilibrium is locally unstable and Pareto-
dominated in its existence region (see the following subsection), we put more eﬀort on
comparing the two pure strategy equilibria, A and C.
By examining these two equilibria, we find that both goods traders and money traders
prefer (pointwise with respect to M) the technology with autarky eﬃciency, i.e., that
with the higher net-of-cost utility. The Pareto ranking in this case is straightforward
because the producers are of measure zero. In general, it may be useful to compare the
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Equilibrium A Equilibrium C
Monetary βxM(1−M)(U − ε) βxM(1−M)(θU − δε)
Autarky (U − ε) (θU − δε)
Table 2.3: Flow Values of Welfare in the Instantaneous Production Case
steady-state social welfare instead of Pareto rankings:
Z = N0V0 +NLVL +NHVH +NmVm. (2.24)
We assume that a social planner can set the initial amount of money M to maximize Z.
Hence we compare the maximal welfare in equilibria A and C.
The flow values of social welfare for both equilibria are shown in Table 2.3.7 The
optimal quantity of money can be easily solved as min{1/2,M1} for equilibrium A and
1/2 for equilibrium C.8 If M1 > 1/2 (which holds when θ is suﬃciently small), the
welfare comparison between EquilibriumA andC is again equivalent to autarky eﬃciency.
Otherwise, the social planner would choose the high technology only when it provides
suﬃciently more net utility than the low technology, that is,
U − ε
θU − δε ≥
1/4
M1(1−M1)
> 1.
From (2.18), M1 is decreasing in θ and independent of δ. Therefore, when the quality
diﬀerence is suﬃciently small, the social planner could still support the production of
type-L goods, even when the type-H goods provides more net utility. On the contrary,
the production cost diﬀerential (captured by δ) does not play any role, which is a result
of the take-it-or-leave-it oﬀer to buyers whose only concern is the quality of the goods.
Under instantaneous production, the social planner can do no better than the autarky
eﬃciency outcome, with a frictional exchange process being introduced. This conclusion
would no longer be true if goods production also takes time (see Section 2.4 below).
7We use flow values here just because the stock values of social welfare for autarky economy are
infinite, and hence incomparable, due to instantaneous production.
8Rigorously speaking, since the admissible set is not closed, the optimal quantity of money does not
exist if M1 < 1/2. For illustrative purposes, however, we will refer to the welfare maximizer over the
closure of the admissible set as the optimal quantity of money.
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Proposition 2: (Welfare and Optimal Quantity of Money) Equilibrium B is always
Pareto dominated by equilibrium A either pointwise with respect to M or in the sense
of equally weighted social welfare maximization. The comparison between equilibrium A
and C possesses the following properties:
(i) under pointwise Pareto criterion, it is equivalent to the case of autarky eﬃciency;
(ii) under social welfare maximization,
a. it is equivalent to autarky eﬃciency if M1 > 1/2,
b. the social planner is less likely to adopt the high technology than autarky eﬃ-
ciency if M1 ≤ 1/2;
(iii) the socially optimal quantity of money is min{1/2,M1} for equilibrium A and 1/2
for equilibrium C.
Recall the nonselectivity eﬀect that too much money may discourage the adoption
of the high technology. By accounting for this, the social planner must set the optimal
quantity of money for equilibrium A at a lower level than for equilibrium C. Also due
to the presence of the nonselectivity eﬀect, the optimal quantity of money in our paper
may be lower than that obtained by Kiyotaki and Wright (1993) under an exogenously
given production technology (which is 1/2).
2.4 Non-instantaneous Production
When production is not instantaneous, i.e., when α is finite, there are a nontrivial steady-
state mass of producers. Thus, µ > M and this creates great algebraic complexity.
Nonetheless, this exercise allows us to gain additional insights into how the introduction
of money could improve technological development.
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2.4.1 Steady-State Monetary Equilibrium
Based on the active equilibrium condition (2.16) we once more obtain: πH = 1, which
means money trader will fully accept the type-H goods in equilibrium. Based on the
three diﬀerent best responses to accepting type-L goods, we again have three equilibria:
(AA): πAAL = 0 ; (BB): π
BB
L ∈ (0, 1); and (CC): πCCL = 1, where the labelings AA, BB,
and CC correspond to A, B, and C, in the instantaneous production case.
To solve the population distribution in the steady state, we equate the outflows and
inflows from and to the population of goods and money traders to yield:
ΛηαN0 = βµxΠHNH (2.25)
(1− Λ)αN0 = βµxΠLNL (2.26)
βµx(ΠLNL +ΠHNH) = β(1− µ)x[hΠH + (1− h)ΠL]Nm (2.27)
where Λ is the proportion of producers employing the high technology. From equation
(2.25) and (2.26), and using πH = ΠH = 1, we can derive:
Λ =
h
h+ η(1− h)ΠL
(2.28)
Observe that Λ is strictly increasing in h, satisfying: limh→0 Λh =
1
η , and limh→1
Λ
h = 1.
Now µ is no longer equal toM . Since the expressions in terms ofM are complex, our
strategy is to establish the existence of various types of equilibria based on the values
of µ. Once this is done, we can derive the corresponding values of M by utilizing the
following monotone increasing relationship between M and µ, which can be obtained by
combining equations (2.25) and (2.27) to yield, Ληα(1− Mµ ) = βµxh(
M
µ −M), or,
M =
µηα (Λ/h)
βxµ(1− µ) + ηα (Λ/h) (2.29)
The expression could be simplified with the aid of the limiting properties under equi-
librium AA or CC. As a result, the population distribution will be determined by only
three endogenous variables, h, µ, and ΠL, since from (2.1), (3.8), (2.3), (2.28) and (2.29),
22
all population masses can be expressed in terms of h, µ and M .9
As before, we can solve the system using the discount rates ∆H and ∆L (see Table
2.4), where the equilibrium acceptability of type-L goods in equilibrium BB is:10
πBBL (µ) =
1
βµx
βµxη(α+ r)θU − {(βµx+ r)ηα+ r[(βµx+ r)(η − δ)− δηα]} ε
[(βµx+ r) + η (α− βµx)]θU + [(βµx+ r)(η − δ)− δηα]ε , (2.30)
and the related proportion of type-H goods in the market becomes:
hBB (µ) =
r(θU −∆Hε)
(1− ρH∆H)β(1− µ)x(1− θ)U
. (2.31)
Although hBB is increasing in µ, the relationship between πBBL and µ is no longer
monotone.11
The values in equilibria AA and CC listed in Table 2.4 can be explained intuitively.
Note that the eﬀective discount factors indicate the time costs over the respective waiting
periods (production, selling, and buying). Take V AA0 as an example. As the producers
must wait for all the three waiting periods, the utility should be discounted by all the
three factors, ∆H , ρH , and ρm. Meanwhile, the production cost is generated at the end of
the production period, so only ∆H is attached to it. This provides the producer’s value
in one cycle, ∆HρAAH ρ
AA
m U − ∆Hε. The value is then obtained by simply dividing the
one-cycle value by one minus the discount factor for a cycle, ∆HρAAH ρ
AA
m .
Repeating the same steps as in the previous section, one can derive parameter regions
for µ (instead of M) to support each type of equilibrium. As shown in the Appendix, we
have: SAA = (0, µ1) ∩ (M2, 1−M2) , where µ1 solves:
(1− θ)U = (βµx+ r)r(U −∆Hε)
β2x2µ(1− µ)(1−∆H) + rβx+ r2
; (2.32)
9Actually we express all the values in terms of µ. In contrast to the instantaneous production case,
µ is now endogenously determined. It seems that it is no longer suitable to use µ to charaterize the
existence conditions. However, equation (2.29) enables us to relate µ with the exogenous variable M in
each equilibrium. All the conditions in terms of µ can be transformed into expressions inM accordingly.
10Like Table 2, we have ρAAH , ρ
BB
H , and ρ
CC
L with the same functional form. ρ
AA
m and ρ
CC
m also have
same functional form. The argument µ may diﬀer.
11The reader can easily check that the solution of πBBL reduces to π
B
L with α→∞ and η → 1.
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Equilibrium AA Equilibrium BB Equilibrium CC
V0 ∆H
ρAAH ρ
AA
m U − ε
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
∆H
ρBBH θU − ε
1− ρBBH ∆H
, or ∆L
ρBBL θU − δε
1− ρBBL ∆L
∆L
ρCCL ρ
CC
m θU − δε
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
VH
ρAAH ρ
AA
m (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
ρBBH (θU −∆Hε)
1− ρBBH ∆H
V CCL
VL 0
ρBBL (θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρBBL ∆L
ρCCL ρ
CC
m (θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρCCL ρCCm
Vm
ρAAm (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
θU −∆Hε
1− ρBBH ∆H
, or
θU −∆Lδε
1− ρBBL ∆L
ρCCm (θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
ΠL 0 πBBL 1
h 1 hBB 0
µ SAA SBB SCC
Table 2.4: Solutions for the Non-instantaneous Production Case
SBB = (M4, µ1), and, S
CC = SC . Analogous to Lemma 1, µ ∈ (0, µ1) iﬀ θU < ρAAM U −
(1− ρAAM )V AA0 . Based on the proofs in Appendix, we can establish the existence regions
of these equilibria:
Proposition 3: (Existence) Under Assumptions 1-3, a steady-state monetary equilib-
rium exists. Depending on the society’s initial endowment of money M , it possesses the
following properties:
(i) πL = 0 with µ ∈ SAA (equilibrium AA);
(ii) πL ∈ (0, 1) with µ ∈ SBB (equilibrium BB);
(iii) πL = 1 with µ ∈ SCC (equilibrium CC);
where multiple equilibria may arise.
2.4.2 Welfare Implications
Due to its complexity, we will not conduct welfare analysis based on the endowment of
money (M). Rather, we restrict our attention to the case where the fraction of money
traders (µ) is identical in diﬀerent types of equilibria. With this modification, we still
have equilibrium AA Pareto dominates equilibriumBB. However the welfare comparison
between equilibria AA and CC is a bit more sophisticated now. Let us derive the social
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Equilibrium AA Equilibrium CC
Monetary
ηαb(U − ε)
r(b+ ηα)
αb(θU − δε)
r(b+ α)
Autarky
(ηα+ r)U − ηαε
r
(α+ r)θU − αδε
r
b ≡ βxµ(1− µ)
Table 2.5: Present Values of Welfare in the Non-Instantaneous Production Case
welfare for the respective equilibria as follows:
ZAA =
ηαb
b+ ηα
µ
U − ε
r
¶
(2.33)
ZCC =
αb
b+ α
µ
θU − δε
r
¶
. (2.34)
where b ≡ βxµ(1− µ).
Obviously the optimal fraction of money traders satisfies µ = 0.5 in each case, pro-
vided that µ1 ≥ 0.5, from which the optimal quantity of money can be derived using
equation (2.29). For pointwise comparison of social welfare between diﬀerent types of
equilibria with respect to µ, we still have the net utility terms, U−ε versus θU−δε as in
the instantaneous production case. However, the slow production process makes the high
technology less attractive than the low technology as the multiplier on the right-hand side
of (2.33) is less than that of (2.34) if η < 1. When the net utility gain from undertaking
the high technology is positive and suﬃciently large to overcome the disadvantage from a
non-instantaneous production process, the welfare under equilibrium AA is greater than
that under equilibrium CC.
Meanwhile, the autarkic values in the respective equilibria are
WAA =
U −∆Hε
1−∆H
=
(ηα+ r)U − ηαε
r
(2.35)
WCC =
θU −∆Lδε
1−∆L
=
(α+ r)θU − αδε
r
. (2.36)
Again, the comparison between the two values depends crucially on the net utility gain
versus the loss in a non-instantaneous production process. Formally, we define q ≡ θU−δεU−ε
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and calculate two critical values for η,
ηZ(θ, δ) = q −
qα(1− q)
α+ b− αq and ηW (θ, δ) = q −
r(1− θ)U
α(U − ε) ,
such that ZAA > ZCC iﬀ η > ηZ, and that W
AA > WCC iﬀ η > ηW . Note that when
q ≥ 1, type-L technology is always chosen in both monetary and autarky economies,
since it provides same net utility but requires less production time.12 In the case where
q < 1, we can show that ηZ > ηW . As a result, the introduction of money can completely
restore the first-best technology choice only when µ1 > 1/2 and η > ηZ.
Nonetheless, the introduction of money does improve the eﬃciency of technology
choices if βx
2
βx2+r < θ <
βx(1−µ)
βx(1−µ)+r , µ < µ1 and η > ηZ (see Proposition A2 in Appendix
and the proof therein). Under βx
2
βx2+r < θ, only can the type-L technology be chosen
in a pure barter economy, as the utility gain from consuming the high-tech good is not
suﬃcient to overcome the time delay cost. While the equalities, θ < βx(1−µ)βx(1−µ)+r and µ < µ1,
ensure that the type-H technology can be adopted in a monetary economy, the condition
η > ηZ guarantees that adopting the high type technology results in higher welfare
than adopting the low one. In this case, search frictions grant too much disadvantage for
producers to adopt the high technology under barter; the introduction of money can fully
mitigate such disadvantage to encourage the employment of the advanced technology in
equilibrium. Summarizing,
Proposition 4: (Money and Technology Choice) When η > ηZ, technology choice in
a monetary economy is autarky eﬃcient. By further assuming βx
2
βx2+r < θ <
βx(1−µ)
βx(1−µ)+r
and µ < µ1, the introduction of money improves the eﬃciency of technology choice by
encouraging the adoption of the high technology that cannot be chosen in the pure barter
economy.
As long as the type-H goods provide more utility and the nonselectivity eﬀect is
suﬃciently small (µ1 ≥ 0.5), autarky eﬃciency is a suﬃcient (but not necessary) condi-
tion for equilibrium AA to dominate CC in social welfare sense. As a consequence, the
monetary economy can improve technological development.
12It is also true in the pure barter economy.
26
Proposition 5: (Welfare under Non-instantaneous Production) While equilibrium AA
always Pareto dominates equilibrium BB, it leads to higher welfare than equilibrium CC
if η > ηZ, and µ1 ≥ 0.5. The optimal quantity of money is min{[2 + βx2ηα ]−1,M(µ1)} for
equilibrium AA with M = µηαβxµ(1−µ)+ηα and [2 +
βx
2α ]
−1 for equilibrium CC.
Notice that the results of social welfare comparison are essentially driven by the values
of goods and money traders. Provided that the two technologies provide the same values
to producers in autarky, the sellers and buyers in the monetary exchange economy would
prefer the high one (pointwise with respect to µ), since
1−∆H
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
>
1−∆L
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
.
However, in terms of Pareto criteria, we must also examine the welfare of producers,
whose relative gain from employing the high technology can be written as:
V AA0 − V CC0 = (
1−∆H
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
WAA − 1−∆L
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
WCC)− (1− θ)U
=
∙
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
U −∆Hε
θU −∆Lδε
− 1
¸
θU −∆Lδε
1− ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
− (1− θ)U .
The term in the square bracket is similar to the value comparison for goods and
money traders, but the last term may upset such a comparison if θ is suﬃciently lower
than one. This last term can be viewed as the diﬀerence in inventory costs per unit of
goods, which is driven by the time-consuming trading period in the monetary economy
with search frictions. Thus, even when the high technology provides a higher autarkic
value, the producers may still prefer the low technology when frictional exchanges are
taken into account.
Another interesting finding is that the producer’s gains from employing the high
technology relevant for decentralized equilibrium (V AA0 − V CC0 ) need not be maximized
at the welfare-optimizing quantity of money. In particular, we can identify a time-saving
eﬀect from 1
1−ρCCL ρCCm ∆L
, which is increasing in µ(1 − µ). In fact, it is the only eﬀect
in the case of instantaneous production, since ∆H = ∆L = 1. When production takes
time, there also exists a mitigation eﬀect, which is decreasing in µ(1 − µ) as long as it
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takes more time to produce the type-H goods (∆H < ∆L).13 Intuitively, a longer waiting
period to trade would mitigate the disadvantage of the high technology in production
time to a greater extent.
When the expected trading period approaches to its minimum (µ tends to 0.5), the
mitigation eﬀect may be strong enough to dominate the time-saving eﬀects under some
parameter values. Figure 2.2 illustrates a numerical example, in which the sign of pro-
ducers’ gain depends on the quantity of money and the mitigation eﬀect dominates the
time saving eﬀect near the optimal quantity of money. The resultant social ineﬃciency
from the presence of a strong mitigation eﬀect leads to a negative gain from employing
the high technology and hence an under-investment in that technology. Summarizing,
Proposition 6: (Under-investment in the High Technology under Non-instantaneous
Production)With a suﬃciently short expected trading period and an endowment of money
near its optimal level, producers tend to under-invest in the high technology in decentral-
ized equilibrium.
2.5 Conclusion
An interesting message our model has delivered is that the use of money aﬀects producers’
technology choices in favor of the high technology in the instantaneous production model
and that such an eﬀect is reinforced if production takes time. Moreover, we identify a
social ineﬃciency caused by search frictions leading to under-investment in the advanced
technology in decentralized equilibrium. Furthermore, in the case of mixed strategy
equilibrium, the share of high-technology output is increasing in the quantity of money.
The implication of our model could go beyond the technology choice issue. Should we
regard the high technology as a production plan of high volume, and the low technology
as one with low volume, it becomes a binary output quantity model, where the utilities,
manufacturing costs and production times are all increasing in the scale of production.
This may shed light on the possibility of multiple equilibria in the multiple consumption
units or divisible goods setup. For instance, in a simple case with constant return and cost
13This eﬀect is via the term, 1−ρ
CC
L ρ
CC
m ∆L
1−ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
= ∆L∆H +
1
1−ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
(1− ∆L∆H ).
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to scale, the highest possible volume of output is best in the sense of social welfare. The
optimal volume of output will be determined by the relevant set of parameters (similar
to SA), which depends on the quantity of money in the economy.
Due to the decentralized exchange mechanism, we have multiple equilibria while the
one with coexistence of both technologies is unstable and Pareto-dominated. One may
wonder whether this finding is robust under an alternative, directed-search framework
(with a high- and a low-quality submarket). Our preliminary results suggest that we
may have a unique stable equilibrium with coexistence of both technologies under proper
conditions. Moreover, when production is instantaneous, an increase in the quantity
of money tends to encourage high-quality goods production, but does not aﬀect the
thickness of each market.
As one of the central features of the model, perfect observability is assumed through-
out. To another extreme, if buyers cannot detect the quality of the commodities trade
at all, then VH always equals VL and producers will always choose the cost-saving tech-
nology without investing in the high technology. In the case of partial observability,
we expect similar results as in Trejos (1997). In particular, if the high technology has
adequate relative eﬃciency over the low, then the buyers would prefer type-H goods
whenever they are able to identify its quality. It is therefore straightforward to conclude
that the presence of private information will not eliminate the positive role of money in
production eﬃciency as long as partial observability is preserved.
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Figure 2.1:  Steady-State Flow Chart 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.2:  Producers’ Net Gains from Investing in High Technology 
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Appendix
A. Technology Choice in a Pure Barter Economy
In this appendix, we investigate the technology choice issue in the scenario of a pure
barter economy. On the basis of the notation we employ in Section II, we can set up the
related values functions:
rV0 = max{α(VL − V0 − δε), ηα(VH − V0 − ε)}, (A1)
rVH = βx2[hΠHH max
πHH
{πHH(U+V0−VH)}+(1−h)ΠLH max
πHL
{πHL(θU+V0−VH)}], (A2)
rVL = βx
2[hΠHLmax
πLH
{πLH(U +V0−VL)}+(1−h)ΠLLmax
πLL
{πLL(θU +V0−VL)}], (A3)
where πi,j indicates the probability for i-type goods trader to accept j-type commodities.
The equilibrium population equations are
ΛηαN0 = βx2[hΠHHπ∗HH + (1− h)ΠLHπ∗HL]NH , (A4)
(1− Λ)αN0 = βx2[hΠHLπ∗LH + (1− h)ΠLLπ∗LL]NL. (A5)
The active equilibrium condition similar to condition (2.16) yields
ΠHH = π∗HH = ΠLH = π
∗
LH = 1. (A6)
As a result, we can rewrite equation (A2) and (A3) as
rVH = βx2[h(U + V0 − VH) + (1− h)π∗HL(θU + V0 − VH)], (A7)
rVL = βx2[hΠHL(U + V0 − VL) + (1− h)ΠLLπ∗LL(θU + V0 − VL)], (A8)
and solve Λ as a function of h
Λ =
h[h+ (1− h)π∗HL]
h[h+ (1− h)π∗HL] + (1− h)η[hΠHL + (1− h)ΠLLπ∗LL]
. (A9)
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Equilibrium Ab Equilibrium Bb Equilibrium Cb
V0 max{∆H(VH − ε),∆L(VL − δε)} ∆H θU − ε
1−∆H
∆L
ρbθU − δε
1− ρb∆L
VH
hβx2(U −∆Hε)
hβx2(1−∆H) + r
θU −∆Hε
1−∆H
ρb(θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρb∆L
VL
(1− h)βx2(θU −∆Lδε)
(1− h)βx2(1−∆L) + r
α+ r
r
η(θU − ε) + δε ρb(θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρb∆L
π∗HL 0 πb 1
π∗LL 1 1 1
h hs or 1 hb 0
Table 2.6: Solutions for Pure Barter Economy with Non-Instantaneous Production
Instantaneous Production
In the instantaneous production case, V0 = max{(VL − δε), (VH − ε)}. Observe that
θU + V0 − VH ≥ θU − ε > 0 under Assumption 1. Therefore ΠHL = π∗HL = 1. Similarly
θU +V0−VL ≥ θU − δε > 0, and ΠLL = π∗LL = 1. From (A7) and (A8), we can find that
VL = VH , which means only the low technology would be chosen, since VL− δε > VH − ε.
The results can be summarized as follows:
Proposition A1 (Pure Barter with Instantaneous Production) Under instantaneous
production with pure barter exchange and Assumption 1, only the type-L technology will
be chosen even when it provides less net utilities than the type-H technology.
Note that, as described in Proposition 2, the social planner will choose the technolo-
gies providing more utilities in the monetary economy under Assumption 1-3 and the
condition M1 > 1/2, it is obvious that the introduction of money does improve the
eﬃciency in technology choice.
Non-Instantaneous Production
When we have non-instantaneous production, it is a bit more complicated. If VH ≤ VL,
the producers will choose only the low technology, which requires less production cost
and shorter production time. From equation (A7) and (A8) as well as h = 0, we can find
that
VH =
βx2π∗HL(θU + V0)
r + βx2π∗HL
and VL =
βx2ΠLLπ∗LL(θU + V0)
r + βx2ΠLLπ∗LL
Hence π∗HL ≤ ΠLLπ∗LL. Meanwhile, we must have θU + V0 − VH ≥ θU + V0 − VL, which
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implies that π∗HL ≥ π∗LL ≥ ΠLLπ∗LL. Since π∗HL = π∗LL = 0 leads to VL = 0 and V0 < 0,
the only possible case is π∗HL = π
∗
LL = 1, where VH = VL, and the producers only choose
the low technology (h = 0).
If VH > VL, we have θU + V0 − VH < θU + V0 − VL, and thus π∗HL ≤ π∗LL. Note that
we cannot have both mixed strategies at the same time. Therefore, we have only four
cases to discuss: (1) π∗HL = π
∗
LL = 1; (2) 0 < π
∗
HL < π
∗
LL = 1; (3) 0 = π
∗
HL ≤ π∗LL < 1;
and (4) 0 = π∗HL < π
∗
LL = 1.
Case 1: π∗HL = π
∗
LL = 1. It implies VH = VL, and the producers only choose the low
technology (h = 0). The solutions are provided as equilibrium Cb in Table 2.6 with
ρb =
βx2
βx2 + r
. (A10)
In this case, we need θU + V0 − VL > 0, which always holds under Assumption 1.
Meanwhile, V0 > 0 requires
δε
θU
<
βx2
βx2 + r
.
Case 2: 0 < π∗HL < π
∗
LL = 1. The immediate implication is
θU + V0 − VH = 0. (A11)
Based on equation (A11), we can rewrite the value functions as
VH =
βx2h(1− θ)U
r
, (A12)
V0 =
βx2h(1− θ)U
r
− θU , (A13)
VL =
βx2[hΠHL + (1− h)] + rΠHL
βx2[hΠHL + (1− h)] + r
VH . (A14)
Observe from (A13) that V0 > 0 implies h > 0 and consequently rV0 = ηα(VH−V0−ε) =
ηα(θU − ε) in the case of positive production time. We can combine it with equation
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(A13) to obtain the proportion of type-H goods
hb =
(ηα+ r)θU − ηαε
βx2(1− θ)U . (A15)
If h = hb < 1, we can substitute (A15) into the expressions of VH and V0
VH =
(ηα+ r)θU − ηαε
r
=
θU −∆Hε
1−∆H
(A16)
and
V0 =
ηα(θU − ε)
r
= ∆H
θU − ε
1−∆H
. (A17)
In order to make the producers indiﬀerent between the two technologies, we need
VL − V0 − δε = η(VH − V0 − ε). (A18)
With the help of equations (A11), (A14) (A16), and (A17) we can convert equation (A18)
into
1−ΠHL
βx2[hbΠHL + (1− hb)] + r
=
(1− η)θU − (δ − η)ε
(ηα+ r)θU − ηαε .
and compute the solution for the cross-type acceptability, denoted as πb. Note that πb < 1
as long as θU > δε. Actually this equilibrium is unstable if we disturb the acceptability
ΠHL slightly away from its equilibrium level. Note that ΠHL ≥ 0 only when
(1− θ)U
(βx2 + r)(1− θ)U − (ηα+ r)θU + ηαε ≥
(1− η)θU − (δ − η)ε
(ηα+ r)θU − ηαε (A19)
(1− θ)U
(1− η)θU − (δ − η)ε ≥
(βx2 + r)(1− θ)U
(ηα+ r)θU − ηαε − 1
The other subcase with hb = 1 requires some particular cost-utility ratio to satisfy
equation (A15). Moreover, we need ΠHL < πb to discourage the producers from choosing
the low technology. As a consequence, this equilibrium does not hold generically.
Case 3: 0 = π∗HL ≤ π∗LL < 1. Now we have VL = 0 and VH =
βx2(U−∆Hε)
βx2(1−∆H)+r . Hence the
producers will only choose the high technology. Note that we need θU + V0 < VH , which
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requires θU < ρbU − (1− ρb)V0, or
∆H < 1−
r(θU − ε)
βx2(1− θ)U − rε , or ηα <
βx2(1− θ)U − rθU
θU − ε . (A20)
Similar to the discussion following Lemma 1, one must guarantee that it is not too
costly to wait for the next trade, instead of producing right now. Observe that, given
Assumption 1 and θ < ρb, we have ρbU > ε, which implies V0 > 0.
Case 4: 0 = π∗HL < π
∗
LL = 1. It demands VL < θU + V0 < VH . While the cross-type
acceptability is zero, we have separating equilibrium with
VH =
hβx2(U −∆Hε)
hβx2(1−∆H) + r
,
VL =
(1− h)βx2(θU −∆Lδε)
(1− h)βx2(1−∆L) + r
,
and
V0 = max{∆H(VH − ε),∆L(VL − δε)}
The condition VL < θU + V0 < VH requires θU +∆H(VH − ε) < VH , or
h > h0 ≡
r(θU −∆Hε)
βx2(1−∆H)(1− θ)U
.
Note that h0 < 1 iﬀ the conditions given in Case 3 are satisfied.
Moreover, we need V0 > 0, which implies
h > h1 ≡
εr
βx2(U − ε)
when the type-H technology is chosen, or
h < h2 ≡ 1−
δεr
βx2(θU − δε)
when the producers employ the low technology. So one of the necessary condition for the
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coexistence of both technologies is
h2 ≥ max{h0, h1}. (A21)
Note that h2 ≥ h1 implies
δε
θU
≤ βx
2U − (βx2 + r)ε
(βx2 + r)U − (βx2 + 2r)ε ,
where the right-hand side is less than βx
2
βx2+r . As a result, being a subset of the existence
region for high-technology only equilibrium, the existence region for coexistence in Case
4 is also a subset of the existence region in Case 1.
Since an increase in h leads to bigger VH and smaller VL, the function f(h) = ∆H(VH−
ε)−∆L(VL − δε) is strictly increasing in h. Moreover, it is easy to find that, under the
necessary condition (A21), f(h2) > 0 and f(h1) < 0. Consequently, there exists a unique
hs ∈ (h1, h2), such that f(hs) = 0. This solution is only valid when
hs ≥ h0. (A22)
As a result, there are two possible equilibria conditional on the parameters. The
separating equilibrium exists only when conditions (A20), (A21) and (A22) are all sat-
isfied, while the producers would choose high technology when we have both (A20)
and εr ≤ βx2(U − ε), or εU <
βx2
βx2+r . Obviously, the existence region of the high-
technology only equilibrium is a subset of that of the low-technology only equilibrium
when 0 < δ ≤ θ < 1, which resembles Lemma 2.
Proposition A2 (Pure Barter with Non-instantaneous Production) Under instantaneous
production with pure barter exchange and Assumption 1, there exist multiple equilibria
where the admissible sets of equilibria vary with diﬀerent primitives of the economy.
Equilibrium Cb (low technology only) exists as long as δεθU <
βx2
βx2+r . The mixed-strategy
equilibrium and the separating equilibrium are unstable. Parameters satisfying θ < βx
2
βx2+r
and inequality (A20) feature the adoption of the high technology.
In case 1, the number of producers and goods holder satisfies αN0 = βx2NL. Hence
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N0 =
βx2
α+βx2 , and NL =
α
α+βx2 . As a result, social welfare becomes
WCb = α
βx2(θU − δε)
r(α+ βx2)
.
Similarly, social welfare in the case of high-technology only equilibrium is
WAb = ηα
βx2(U − ε)
r(ηα+ βx2)
.
When both equilibria coexist, we must have
η > ηA ≡
qβx2
α+ βx2 − αq ,
where q = θU−δεU−ε , as previously defined.
B. Proofs
In this appendix, we provide detailed mathematical derivations of some fundamental
relationships and propositions presented in the main text.
Proof of Lemma 1:
In equilibrium A, we need πL = 0, and hence θU + V0 − Vm < 0. Using the solutions
provided in Table 2, we can obtain
θU +
ρAHρ
A
mU − ε
1− ρAHρAm
− ρ
A
m(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
< 0
or
θU − ε+ ρ
A
Hρ
A
m(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
− ρ
A
m(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
< 0.
Therefore,
θU − ε
U − ε <
ρAm(1− ρAH)
1− ρAHρAm
Employing the definition of (2.8) and (2.17), we can multiply (βµx + r)[β(1 − µ)x + r]
to both the numerator and the denominator. Now we have
θU − ε
U − ε <
β(1− µ)x
βx+ r
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or
M <M1 ≡ 1−
(βx+ r)(θU − ε)
βx(U − ε) (B1)
where we use the equilibrium result that µ =M .
In addition, we also need the producer’s value to be positive, i.e.
ρAHρ
A
mU − ε
1− ρAHρAm
> 0.
Hence
ε
U
> ρAHρ
A
m =
β2x2µ(1− µ)
β2x2µ(1− µ) + (βx+ r)r
or
µ(1− µ) > Q ≡ (βx+ r)rε
β2x2(U − ε)
. (B2)
Observe that the quadratic equation given by the equality in (B2) has two real roots
within the interval (0, 1), if Assumption 2 holds. To diﬀerentiate the two roots, we define
the smaller root to beM2. As a result, condition (B2) can be written asM2 < M < 1−M2
in equilibrium.
In conclusion, the existence region for equilibrium A is given by M < M1 and M2 <
M < 1−M2.
Proof of Lemma 2:
The derivation of the existence region is analogous to that of condition (B2). We only
have to replace U and ε with θU and δε respectively. In addition, if 0 < δ ≤ θ < 1 and
Assumption 1 holds,
(βx+ r)rε
β2x2(U − ε)
=
(βx+ r)rδε
β2x2(δU − δε)
≥ (βx+ r)rδε
β2x2(θU − δε)
.
As a result, SA ⊆ SC.
Derivation of hB and πB:
Since θU + V B0 − V Bm = 0, we can rewrite the money holder’s value (2.6) as
rVm = β(1− µ)xh(1− θ)U .
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Based on the solution listed in Table 2, we have
hB =
r
β(1− µ)x(1− θ)U
θU − ε
1− ρBH
=
(βµx+ r)(θU − ε)
β(1− µ)x(1− θ)U
While the producers are indiﬀerence between the two technologies, the two solutions
of V B0 listed in Table 2 should be the same, i.e.
ρBHθU − ε
1− ρBH
=
ρBLθU − δε
1− ρBL
=
ρBL (θU − δε)
1− ρBL
− δε.
Note that
ρBL
1− ρBL
=
βµxΠL
r
=
ρBH
1− ρBH
ΠL.
Therefore
ρBHθU − ε
1− ρBH
=
ρBH(θU − δε)
1− ρBH
ΠL − δε
πB = ΠL =
ρBHθU − ε+ (1− ρBH)δε
ρBH(θU − δε)
= 1− (1− δ)ε
ρBH(U − δε)
Proof of Lemma 3:
The conditions for existence come from the requirement of V0 > 0, and hB, πB ∈ (0, 1),
where hB and πB are given by equation (2.22) and (2.21), respectively. Assumption 1
implies that hB > 0, while the condition hB < 1 is equivalent to µ = M < M1. The
latter comes from the fact that
(βxM1 + r)(θU − ε) =
∙
βx− (βx+ r)(θU − ε)
U − ε + r
¸
(θU − ε)
= (βx+ r)
(1− θ)U
U − ε (θU − ε)
= βx(1−M1)(1− θ)U
and that hB is increasing in µ.
Meanwhile, V0 > 0 iﬀ
ρBH =
βµx
βµx+ r
>
ε
θU
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or
µ > M4 ≡
rε
βx(θU − ε) . (B3)
Observe that condition (B3), along with Assumption 1, implies that
πB > 1− (1− δ)θU
θU − δε =
δ(θU − ε)
θU − δε > 0,
while Assumption 1 also implies that πB < 1.
Now consider the relationship between SB and SA. We know that SB is non-empty,
iﬀ M4 < M1.Observe that, with Q ≡ (βx+r)rεβ2x2(U−ε) , we have
M4(1−M1) =
rε
βx(θU − ε)
(βx+ r)(θU − ε)
βx(U − ε) = Q. (B4)
HenceM1(1−M1) > M4(1−M1) = Q, andM4(1−M4) > M4(1−M1) = Q. By Lemma
1, M1 ∈ SA, and M4 ∈ SA. Consequently, SB = (M4,M1) ⊆ SA.
Proof of Proposition 1:
Since the stability is proved in the body text, only remaining work is to show that
all the existence regions are non-empty under Assumption 1-3. Given Assumption 2, we
know that 1
2
∈ (M2, 1 −M2), and 12 ∈ SC . Now we need to establish M2 < M1. One
suﬃcient condition is that Q < M1(1−M1), which boils down to
(U − ε)rε < (θU − ε)[βx(1− θ)U − r(θU − ε)],
or
1
θU − ε +
θ
1− θ <
βx
r
.
Note that Q < M1(1−M1) and equation (B4) implyM4 < M1. As a result, Assumption
1-3 guarantee that SB 6= ∅.
Derivation of the social welfare in the instantaneous production case:
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In equilibrium A, the social welfare
ZA = MV Am + (1−M)V AH =M
ρAm(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
+ (1−M)ρ
A
Hρ
A
m(U − ε)
1− ρAHρAm
=
U − ε
1− ρAHρAm
ρAm[ρ
A
H + (1− ρAH)M ] =
U − ε
(βx+ r)r
β(1− µ)x(βµx+ rM)
=
βxM(1−M)(U − ε)
r
,
where the last equality employs the equilibrium result that µ =M . Analogously, we can
derive
ZB =
βxM(1−M)(θU − δε)
r
.
Proof of Proposition 2:
For each M ∈ SB, M <M1 and ρAH = ρBH . We have
V Am
V Bm
=
ρAm(1− ρBH)
1− ρAHρAm
U − ε
θU − ε =
β(1− µ)xr
(βx+ r)r
U − ε
θU − ε > 1
and hence V AH = ρ
A
HV
A
m > ρ
B
HV
B
m = V
B
H . While the producers are indiﬀerent between the
two technologies, V BH − ε = V BL − δε. Consequently V BH > V BL . So the goods trader’s
value in equilibrium A is always higher than that in equilibrium B. To the producers,
we also have V A0 = V
A
H − ε > V BH − ε = V B0 . With the knowledge that SB ⊆ SA, we
can conclude that equilibrium A Pareto dominates equilibrium B either for same M or
at the optimal quantity of money. The other parts are straightforward.
Derivation of hBB and πBB:
Since θU + V B0 − V Bm = 0, we can rewrite the money holder’s value (2.6) as
rVm = β(1− µ)xh(1− θ)U .
Based on the solution listed in Table 4, we have
hBB =
r
β(1− µ)x(1− θ)U
θU −∆Hε
1− ρBBH ∆H
While the producers are indiﬀerence between the two technologies, two solutions for
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V BB0 listed in Table 4 should be the same. Since θU + V
BB
0 − V BBm = 0, we can also
equate two solutions for money holder’s value
θU −∆Hε
1− ρBBH ∆H
=
θU −∆Lδε
1− ρBBL ∆L
Therefore
ρBBL ∆L = ρ
BB
H ∆H +
∆Hε−∆Lδε
θU −∆Hε
(1− ρBBH ∆H)
ρBBH
1− ρBBH
ΠL =
ρBBL ∆L
∆L − ρBBL ∆L
=
(θU −∆Hε)ρBBH ∆H − (∆Hε−∆Lδε)(1− ρBBH ∆H)
(θU −∆Hε)(∆L − ρBBH ∆H) + (∆Hε−∆Lδε)(1− ρBBH ∆H)
πBB = ΠL =
r
βµx
(θU −∆Hε)ρBBH ∆H − (1− ρBBH ∆H)(∆H −∆Lδ)ε
(θU −∆Hε)(∆L − ρBBH ∆H) + (1− ρBBH ∆H)(∆H −∆Lδ)ε
=
r
βµx
ρBBH ∆HθU − (∆H −∆L|delta+ ρBBH ∆H∆Lδ)ε
(∆L − |rhoBBH ∆H)θU + (∆H −∆Lδ + ρBBH ∆H∆Lδ −∆H∆L)ε
After substituting the expressions of the eﬀective discount factors, we can obtain the
result given in the main text. Note that when ∆H = ∆L = 1,
πBB =
r
βµx
ρBBH θU − (1− δ + ρBBH δ)ε
(1− ρBBH )θU − (1− ρBBH )δε
=
r
βµx
(θU − δε)ρBBH − (1− δ)ε
(θU − δε)(1− ρBBH )
=
(θU − ε)ρBBH − (1− δ)ε
(θU − δε)ρBBH
= πB
Proof of Proposition 3:
By comparing the solution for producer’s values (V0) in Table 2 and 4, we can find
that the condition for V0 > 0 would not change in the non-instantaneous production case.
However, in Equilibrium AA, the condition θU + V0 − Vm < 0 leads to
θU +∆H
ρAAH ρ
AA
m U − ε
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
− ρ
AA
m (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
< 0
or
(1− ρAAm )(U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
< (1− θ)U
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Note that the left-hand side is strictly increasing in µ, since
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
1− ρAAm
= 1 +
ρAAm − ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
1− ρAAm
= 1 +
ρAAm (1− ρAAH ∆H)
1− ρAAm
= 1 +
ρAAm (1−∆H)
1− ρAAm
+
ρAAm (1− ρAAH )∆H
1− ρAAm
= 1 +
β(1− µ)x
r
(1−∆H) +
β(1− µ)x
βµx+ r
∆H .
Denote µ1 = µ1(∆H) as the solution for
(1− θ)U = (1− ρ
AA
m )(U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
=
(βµx+ r)r(U −∆Hε)
β2x2µ(1− µ)(1−∆H) + rβx+ r2
. (B5)
Hence we need µ < µ1 to guarantee θU +V0−Vm < 0. By Assumption 1, θU > ε. Hence
µ1 < 1. When ∆H = 1,
1− θU − ε
U − ε =
(1− θ)U
U − ε =
βµx+ r
βx+ r
= 1− β(1− µ)x
βx+ r
.
Hence µ1(1) =M1. Moreover,
(1− ρAAm )(U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
− (1− ρ
AA
m )ε
ρAAH ρAAm
= (1− ρAAm )
ρAAH ρ
AA
m (U −∆Hε)− (1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H)ε
(1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H)ρAAH ρAAm
= (1− ρAAm )
ρAAm ρ
AA
H U − ε
(1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H)ρAAH ρAAm
≥ 0
as long as V AA0 > 0. It means the right-hand side of (B5) is just a constant plus a term
that is increasing in ∆H . Recall that this term is also strictly increasing in µ. Therefore
the implicit function µ1(∆H) given by (B5) is decreasing in ∆H , and µ1(∆H) ≥ µ1(1) =
M1 in non-instantaneous production case, where ∆H < 1.
As a consequence, Assumptions 1-3 are suﬃcient for all the existence regions to be
nonempty in the case of non-instantaneous production.
Derivation of the social welfare in the non-instantaneous production case:
Consider equilibrium AA with h = 1 first. From equation (2.25)-(2.29), along with
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the population identity Nm + NH +NL + N0 = 1 and Nm = M in equilibrium, we can
solve
N0 =
µ−M
µ
and NH =
M(1− µ)
µ
.
Based on the equation (2.9), (2.10) and the solutions listed in Table 4, we have
ZAA =
µ−M
µ
V AA0 +
M(1− µ)
µ
V AAH +MV
AA
m
=
µ−M
µ
∆H(ρAAH V
AA
m − ε) +
M(1− µ)
µ
ρAAH V
AA
m +MV
AA
m
= V AAm
∙
µ−M
µ
∆Hρ
AA
H +
M(1− µ)
µ
βµx
βµx+ r
+M
¸
− µ−M
µ
∆Hε
=
ρAAm (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
∙
µ−M
µ
∆HρAAH +M
βx+ r
βµx+ r
¸
− µ−M
µ
∆Hε
=
µ−M
µ
ρAAm (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
∙
∆HρAAH +
Mµ
µ−M
βx+ r
βµx+ r
¸
− µ−M
µ
∆Hε
Recall that, when h = 1, M =
µηα
βxµ(1− µ) + ηα , and hence,
µ−M
µ
=
βxµ(1− µ)
βxµ(1− µ) + ηα and
Mµ
µ−M =
ηα
βx(1− µ)
As a consequence,
µ
µ−MZ
AA =
ρAAm (U −∆Hε)
1− ρAAH ρAAm ∆H
∙
∆HρAAH +
ηα
βx(1− µ)
βx+ r
βµx+ r
¸
−∆Hε
=
(U −∆Hε)ηα [βµxβx(1− µ) + (ηα+ r)(βx+ r)]
β2x2µ(1− µ)r + (ηα+ r)(rβx+ r2)
−∆Hε
=
(U −∆Hε)ηα
r
−∆Hε
=
ηαU −∆Hε(ηα+ r)
r
=
ηα(U − ε)
r
and
ZAA =
µ−M
µ
ηα(U − ε)
r
=
βxµ(1− µ)
βxµ(1− µ) + ηα
ηα(U − ε)
r
.
We can compute ZBB analogously.
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Derivation of the social welfare in barter economy:
Recall that in the low-technology only equilibrium, the number of producers and
goods holder satisfies αN0 = βx2NL, which implies N0 =
βx2
α+βx2 , and NL =
α
α+βx2 . Hence
the social welfare becomes
WCb =
βx2
α+ βx2
∆L
ρbθU − δε
1− ρb∆L
+
α
α+ βx2
ρb(θU −∆Lδε)
1− ρb∆L
=
βx2∆L(ρbθU − δε) + αρb(θU −∆Lδε)
(α+ βx2)(1− ρb∆L)
=
(βx2∆L + α)ρbθU − (βx2 + αρb)∆Lδε
(α+ βx2)(1− ρb∆L)
= α
(βx2 + α+ r)ρbθU − (βx2 + αρb)δε
(α+ βx2)(α+ r − αρb)
= α
(βx2 + αρb)(θU − δε)
(α+ βx2)(α+ r − αρb)
= α
βx2(θU − δε)
r(α+ βx2)
Analogously, the social welfare in the high-technology only equilibrium
WAb = ηα
βx2(U − ε)
r(ηα+ βx2)
.
Proof of ηZ > ηb > ηW given βxµ(1− µ) > βx2, and q < 1:
It is easy to show that ηZ > ηb iﬀ βxµ(1− µ) > βx2.
Comparing ηb and ηW ,
ηb − ηW =
βx2q
βx2 + α− αq − q +
r(1− θ)U
α(U − ε)
= − α(1− q)q
βx2 + α− αq +
r(1− θ)U
α(U − ε)
Given q < 1, we know ηb > ηW iﬀ
k(q) = −α(1− q)q + x(b+ α− αq)
= αq2 − αq(1 + x) + x(b+ α) > 0,
where we employ the short-hand notation x ≡ r(1−θ)Uα(U−ε) > 0. Observe that k(1) > 0,
k(0) > 0. To have at least a real root between 0 and 1, we need 0 < 1+x
2
< 1, and a
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positive discriminant. However, when 0 < x < 1, the discriminant
D = α2(1 + x)2 − 4α(b+ α)
= α[α(1 + x)2 − 4(b+ α)] < 0.
As a consequence, ηb > ηW , for all 0 < q < 1.
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CHAPTER III 
 
NON-FUNDAMENTAL ASSET PRICING UNDER 
HETEROGENEOUS PRIOR BELIEFS 
 
“The actual price at which any commodity is commonly sold is called its market price. 
It may either be above, or below, or exactly the same with its natural price.” (Adam Smith, 
The Wealth of Nations, Book I, Chapter VII, paragraph 7) 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Since the seminal paper of Lucas (1978), present value approach has been widely used by 
financial analysts to calculate the fundamental values of stocks. Recently, observing the 
discrepancies between stock prices and their underlying present values, economists provide 
several revised asset pricing approaches, such as the presence of bubbles, stochastic discounting, 
or unconventional behavior suggested by psychological evidence.1 While most of them try to 
compute the values of assets that are bought and held forever, the representative agent 
framework they employed guarantees that the market prices are the same as the valuations.2 
In an economy with heterogeneous agents, the above mentioned approaches fail to 
determine market prices directly since they are essentially asset valuation methods for each 
investor. Stemming from the ideas initiated by Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996), 
                                                 
1 Campbell (2000), Barberis and Thaler (2003) list some of the empirical puzzles and provide nice surveys about the explanations 
on the basis of stochastic discount factors, arbitrage constraint, nonstandard behavior suggested by psychological evidence. The 
surveys and discussions about bubbles can be found in Blanchard and Fischer (1989, Chapter 5) and Brunnermeier (2001 Section 
2.3). 
2 We use the term "bubble" in a narrow sense, since the existence of bubbles in most bubble literatures, such as Blanchard and 
Fischer (1985, Chapter 5), Diba and Grossman (1988), Santos and Woodford (1997), requires an explosive Ponzi process and an 
infinite horizon. Since it has is no direct (or explicit) link with market trading opportunities so far, we may consider it as a part of 
the asset values. Note that it is difficult to justify negative bubbles in these models. In contrast, the deviation from fundamental 
values in our model can be positive and negative, does not require any explosive process and can exist even in a finite horizon. 
this paper is among the first few that propose a dynamic general equilibrium framework
to compute the market prices under heterogeneous prior beliefs and even endogenize
profitable speculative manipulations. We show that investors submit a trading price
according to a non-fundamental asset pricing formula, instead of the expected funda-
mental values. Intuitively, since the stocks are sold at the expected market prices instead
of investors’ expected asset value, there should be an additional term accounting for
the reselling opportunity or portfolio adjustment requirement in a market with active
traders.3
One may ask: “why investors have to actively adjust their portfolios?” We know that
rational expectations are usually conditional on available information. When new signals
arrive, investors updated their beliefs about some important stock pricing inputs such as
the firm’s productivity, the sector’s prospect, Greenspan’s opinion about the economy,
etc. The optimal portfolio has to change accordingly. While portfolio adjustment is
impossible in a representative agent model, since stock prices will jump to the level with
no trading opportunity due to identical valuations of the asset for both buyers and sellers,
it is much easier to justify transactions among heterogeneous agents.
Moreover, due to the law of iterated expectations (LIE), the expected capital gain is
zero under the representative agent framework.4 In contrast, in an economy with hetero-
geneous agents, where marginal agents determine the asset prices, the characteristic of
marginal agents is likely to change over time, making LIE inapplicable. As demonstrated
in this paper, during the learning period (when the true state has yet been revealed), the
anticipation of forthcoming signals now results in a generically non-trivial expected capi-
tal gain from active portfolio adjustments. Based on the discussion in Harrison and Kreps
link with market trading opportunities so far, we may consider it as a part of the asset values. Note that
it is diﬃcult to justify negative bubbles in these models. In contrast, the deviation from fundamental
values in our model can be positive and negative, does not require any explosive process and can exist
even in a finite horizon.
3For example, mutual fund managers have to review and adjust their portfolio more than once in
every fiscal year, in an eﬀort to catch up or outperform the competitors to attract potential investors.
Long-term investors, such as Warren Buﬀet, can buy the stock and then leave the market. However,
stock prices recorded in the stock exchange only reflect the prices of the assets under adjustment.
4The expected capital gain can be non-zero in the presence of some additional explosive process
(bubbles). However, the growth rate of expected bubble term must be the exactly same as the gross
return for risk-free assets, which is hard to be justified in reality. Hence we don’t take any explosive
processes into account.
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(1978), we regard this component as non-fundamental since the trading opportunities are
crucial to its presence.
As one of the main results of this paper, investors would not buy the stocks at their
expected present values (EPVs). Instead, the new asset pricing formula proposed in this
paper contains the above-mentioned non-fundamental component. Moreover, the stock
prices may persistently deviate from their dividend-based fundamental values for years
or even decades, as illustrated in several empirical findings.5
Another key feature of the proposed framework in this paper is the endogenization
of profitable speculative manipulations. The Bayesian learning structure embedded in
our model, along with the assumption of asymmetric information and inference of private
signals from previous stock performance, explains the presence of positive short-run serial
correlation in the stock market returns,6 as well as the existence of the “feedback loops”
described in Shiller (2000).7 As one step ahead, we demonstrate that speculators can
make use of the “feedback loops” to profit from manipulating stock prices at least in a
stock market with price fluctuation limits. Intuitively, speculators can bid up the stock
prices to hit the upper bounds, pretending that they receive better signals than what
they really have. Subsequent investors would be misinformed and raise the stock prices
accordingly. The boundedness of stock prices can lead to severe signal distortions, and
thus make this kind of price manipulation profitable.
There are interesting policy implications related to the above finding. Being a measure
employed by more than 16 stock markets, including Tokyo Stock Exchange, to prevent
violent price fluctuations due to speculative trading, daily fluctuation limits turns out to
encourage speculations in the long run. Our result provides a new theoretical support
for empirical findings, such as Kim and Rhee (1997), about the ineﬀectiveness of price
limits.
5Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997, Figure 7.2) estimate the expected dividend components in CRSP
based on a vector autoregressive (VAR) model and demonstrate a sustained negative deviation in the
period of 1910-1927 and two positive ones in 1958-1975 and 1985-1994. Similar observation can be
obtained in Shiller (2000, Figure 9.1), which shows that the latest sustained positive deviation from the
ex post dividend present value is still in the ascendant at least in 2000.
6Campbell, Lo and Mackinlay (1997, Chapter 2) find the autocorrelations for the first lag of stock
returns to be positive and statistically significant in CRSP data, while Cutler, Poterba and Summers
(1991) provide similar evidence in 12 other countries.
7The feedback loop means that a rise in stock prices is more likely to be followed by another rise.
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Other interesting findings include the non-monotone relationship between the mag-
nitude of the portfolio adjustment component and the quality of signaling noises, and
the consequences of signaling distortions due to boundedness of stock prices or higher
dimensions of signaling noises. Apart from those, there can be more possible extensions
in future studies to make current framework closer to reality.
In terms of methodology, this paper provides the first eﬀort to introduce overlapping
generations framework into the study on asset pricing with heterogeneous agents, and
features the intriguing depiction of price changes during the learning process.8 Specifi-
cally, our proposed model setup can explain not only why the asset prices may deviate
from their fundamental values during the learning period, but also how the prices would
converge to their fundamental values when the beliefs approaches the truth. As a result,
we no loner rely on exogenous booms and busts of bubbles to explain the relationship
between asset prices and their fundamental values.
Despite of several possible dimensions of heterogeneity in investors’ traits, this paper
focuses on heterogeneous prior beliefs just to illustrate how the heterogeneity among
investors can aﬀect the asset prices. As a matter of fact, recent empirical evidence
provided by Anderson, Ghycels and Juergens (2005) suggests that heterogeneous beliefs
among financial analyst matter in asset pricing. While the financial analysts are likely
to have similar information set in a competitive market, we regard heterogeneous prior
beliefs as a good proxy for heterogeneity among investors. Nonetheless, we believe that
our framework is friendly to other heterogeneities, and delegate them to future studies.
Literature Review
Harrison and Kreps (1978) and Morris (1996) point out analogous rationale of our
paper by suggesting that the opportunity to resell the stock to more optimistic investors
would lead to a positive deviation from the fundamental values, based on the assumption
that the group of most optimistic agents have suﬃcient financial resources to buy all the
available stocks. This paper demonstrates that both positive and negative deviations are
possible under a more general wealth distribution where each agent has limited financial
8Note that the overlapping generations framework is more closer to reality than it seems. Regarding
the living periods of agents as the life cycle of a fixed portfolio, we can mimic real-life economy by
revising the assumptions on wealth distribution and information structure.
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resources.
As compared with other studies on asset pricing under heterogeneous beliefs, this pa-
per diﬀers from the works by Varian (1985), Abel (1989), Detemple and Murthy (1994)
in terms of aggregation method, which we regard as the crux of the matter in heteroge-
neous agent models. Following the basic microeconomic approach, we compute the total
amount demanded/supplied for each price and then clear the market. This method is
similar to Miller (1977), where the beliefs of marginal agents determine the stock prices.
As a result, our model behaves diﬀerently from those employing average beliefs or average
prices of all agents.
As a matter of fact, the market microstructure literatures provide another framework
to study the impact from heterogeneous agents and lead to similar results as ours.9
For instance, Du (2003) demonstrates that stock prices may over- or under-react when
investors have heterogeneous beliefs. Allen and Gale (1992) illustrate how the speculators
make profit by manipulating stock prices, while Aggarwal and Wu (2003) extend the
model and study the empirical evidence from the US cases identified by SEC. However,
the demand and supply schemes for each type of traders are exogenously given in the
market microstructure framework. In contrast, our general equilibrium settings make it
possible to derive the demand scheme based on investors’ optimization behavior.10
Our model setup also benefits greatly from the latest development about the impact
of learning on asset pricing. Bulkley and Tonks (1989) suggest that dividend announce-
ments have an additional indirect eﬀect to stock pricing via adjusting the estimation of
dividend growth. Timmermann (1996) illustrates this idea by simulating an estimation-
based asset pricing model. Pastor and Veronesi (2004) argue that the uncertainty about
dividend growth rate, due to its convexity in dividend growth in the asset pricing for-
mula, would lead to a higher expected present value of a firm than that based on expected
dividend growth. Although these papers also study the information content in the an-
nouncement of earnings or dividends, they still rest on the conventional representative
agent framework, thus fail to investigate speculative manipulations due to the ignorance
9A comprehensive review of market microstructure models can be found in O’Hara (1995).
10Although supply is inelastic in the current two-period overlapping generations framework, we can
easily make it elastic in the extended multi-period settings.
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of expected capital gains.
Bayesian learning structure and signal distortions introduced in this paper are inspired
by the social learning literatures discussed in Brunnermeier (2001) and Chamley (2003b),
most of which assume exogenous payoﬀ schemes.11 In contrast, this paper provides a
general equilibrium framework to determine price process endogenously.
3.2 The Model
Consider a prototypical two-period overlapping generations model with two assets. One
is a risk-free asset with infinite supply and a constant gross return of R with R > 1.
The investors can also buy common stocks issued by the one and only listed company.12
Shortselling is forbidden on both markets.
At time 0, the firm is listed in the stock market by an initial public oﬀer (IPO) to
generation 0 after the circulation of its prospectus about the its pre-IPO performance.
The IPO price per share is P0 = 1, while the number of outstanding shares, S, depends
on the volume of applications. For simplicity, the shares are assumed to be perfectly
divisible. After the issuance, the number of shares is fixed but the price, Pt, can change
over time.
Each generation, indexed by the date of entrance to the stock market, constitutes a
continuum of agents with a Lebesgue measure of one. Each agent, assumed to be risk
neutral, is initially endowed with one unit of capital. For tractability, borrowing is not
allowed in the economy.13 As we will see later, it is already diﬃcult to find analytic
solutions in this simple economy. Nonetheless, there are full of interesting results even
11Chamley (2003b) reviews several frameworks where investors can infer private signals from other
agents’ behaviors. For instance, in the information cascades modeled by Banerjee (1992) and Bikhchan-
dani, Hirshleifer, and Welch (1992), individual learning would be outvoiced by the observation of the
history. Avery and Zemsky (1998) show that unbounded price adjustment could lead eﬃcient learn-
ing and thus prevent herd behavior, while the introducing another dimension of signaling noises may
deter the learning process. Chamley (2003a) investigates speculative manipulation in foreign exchange
markets, while Abreu and Brunnermeier (2003) study the endogenous timing to break a bubble.
12We can regard the firm as a portfolio of many stocks. It is not diﬃcult to allow for more than one
listed firms, but the loss in tractability outweighs the marginal gain.
13It is not diﬃcult to extend the model to allow for borrowing. Note that the collateral requirements
would set some boundary for the amount to borrow. In this sense, we expect that the results would not
change qualitatively.
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within such a stylized setting.
At period t > 0 (from time t to t+1), the young agents (generation t) enter the stock
market and bid for the common stocks sold by the old agents (generation t− 1). If the
bidding price is lower than the market price, an agent would invest all the money in the
risk-free asset.14 At period t + 1, they sell all the assets and enjoy their retirement on
the beach. The stock exchange only generates one price each period after collecting all
the orders. For tractability purpose, consumption is assumed to be valued only in the
second period of their life,15 which simplifies our model by imposing forced savings on
the young investors and inelastic supply of stocks.
3.2.1 States and Signals
The information structure follows the social learning literatures concerning binary states
and Gaussian signals.16 Before the IPO, the nature chooses, once for all, the quality of
the listed firm, i ∈ {H,L}, which is unknown to any agents. The firm’s realized profit
per share st announced in period t is randomly drawn from a Gaussian distribution with
mean θi, variance σ2 and a probability density function (pdf) of φ(·; θi, σ2).17,18 To ensure
the results to be nontrivial, we assume that the expected dividends satisfy
θL < R− 1 < θH . (3.1)
The dividend payout ratio is set as 100 percent, i.e. all the profits generated in that
period are paid to the current shareholders as dividend before the market opens. We
assume the earnings and dividends at period t are known only to current shareholders
14Since we have a continuum of agents, those who are indiﬀerent between investing in the two assets
are of measure zero. Hence there is no need to take mixed strategies into accout.
15Actually this would be the optimal decision for agents with a linear utility function and a subjective
discounting rate lower than the risk-free rate.
16Following the social learning literatures, the model focus on signal extraction, since the signals are
exogenous.
17In fact, st is the corporate earnings in period t− 1. Current index indicates that it is essencially a
signal in period t, which simplifies the notations.
18The noises can follow any other distributions. Gaussian distribution is chosen due to its simplicity
in calculation and easier comparison with other social learning models. Admittedly, this assumption
violates limited liability for investments in stock market, but we may consider the negative dividends as
seasoned equity oﬀer. Nonetheless, the results of this paper would still hold for other distibutions, such
as truncated Gaussian distribution.
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Figure 3-1: Sequence of Events
(generation t − 1) and potential stock buyers (generation t). While the true quality of
the firm is unknown, the realized profit per share also serves as a signal.
3.2.2 The Sequence of Events
As we described above, agents in generation t are born at time t with endowment of
one unit of capital as well as heterogeneous prior beliefs. At period 0, the firm issue the
stocks to young agents in generation 0. The sequence of events within period t > 0, can
be summarized as follows:
(i) The firm announces its profit per share st to the young generation (generation t),
and pay the same amount as dividends to the shareholders (generation t− 1);
(ii) After doing their research on the history of stock price performance and current
signal of the company’s performance st, the young generation update their beliefs
about the company’s quality, and then bid for the stocks;
(iii) After receiving the dividends, the shareholders of the old generation submit market
price orders of their holding stocks;
(iv) The market generates a price Pt for the stock according to the bidding mechanism
described below, where the losers, whose bidding price is lower than the market
price, invest in the risk-free assets;
(v) The old generation (generation t− 1) retire and consume.
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3.2.3 Evolution of Beliefs
Agents are endowed with prior beliefs, µ−1, about the probability of the good state
when they are born.19 The prior beliefs are heterogeneous for agents within the same
generation, but its distribution, characterized by a cumulative density function (cdf) of
F−1(·), is same for each generation, and is assumed to be common knowledge. Later, we
refer to this distribution as birth distribution of prior beliefs.
Similar to all the models of herding behavior, we assume that the agents can observe
the history of prices and the number of shares, ht = {S, P0, P1, . . . , Pt−1}, but the firm’s
past earnings are not recorded.20 Hence, the young agents have to make an inference
from ht to obtain the estimated signals Ωt = {sˆ0, sˆ1, . . . , sˆt−1}. We set Ω0 = ∅ for
notational purposes. In contrast, the firm announces its latest performance, st, to the
young investors of generation t. Knowing ht and st, the young agents update their beliefs
to a distribution with a cdf of F (·;Ωt, st).21
On the basis of Bayesian inference in Chamley (2003b, section 2.1), a t-generation
agent with a prior belief of µ−1 would update their beliefs to µt such that
µˆτ
1− µˆτ
= m(sˆτ )
µˆτ−1
1− µˆτ−1
, τ = 0, 1, . . . , t− 1 (3.2)
µt
1− µt
= m(st)
µˆt−1
1− µˆt−1
, (3.3)
where
m(st) =
φ(st; θH , σ2)
φ(st; θL, σ2)
.
19The endowment of prior beliefs is exogenous in this model. We can regard it as diﬀerent interpre-
tation about the future of the firm and the industry from the information contained in the prospectus
due to heterogeneous knowledge endowment within each generation.
20Although this assumption is somewhat unrealistic as that the history of a listing firm’s earnings
is observable, it greatly simplifies the model and provides an easier comparison with the conventional
EPV approach. In fact, whithout signals distortion, we do have perfect learning, so the observability
of earnings does not aﬀect the results about sustained deviations from fundamentals. In the cases with
signal distortions, the demonstration of profitability in speculative manipulation can easily apply for
other type of signals, such as earnings manipulation by the listed firm. We could have relaxed this
assumption but it would complicate the paper by introducing another economy.
21In the case of perfect learning, we have Ωt = Ωt−1 ∪ {st}. However, it does not hold when we have
signal distortions and the inferred signals no longer equal to the true ones.
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Since the signals are normally distributed, we can rewrite the updating multiplier as
mt = m(st) = exp
∙
(θH − θL)(2st − θH − θL)
2σ2
¸
. (3.4)
Observe that the current beliefs would also be heterogeneous within each generation due
to the heterogeneity in their prior beliefs. Moreover, although each generation has the
same distribution of prior beliefs, the current beliefs could diﬀer a lot among diﬀerent
generations due to diﬀerent history they can observe.
In order to derive the cdf of the posterior beliefs, we define the cumulative updating
multiplier
Mˆt = m(st)
t−1Y
τ=0
m(sˆτ ).
Hence, the agents with a posterior belief of µt have a prior belief
µ−1 =
µt
Mˆt + (1− Mˆt)µt
,
and the cdf of posterior beliefs satisfies
F (µt;Ωt, st) = F−1
Ã
µt
Mˆt + (1− Mˆt)µt
!
, (3.5)
as long as we can infer sˆτ from hτ+1, for τ = 1, 2, · · · , t− 1. In the following subsection,
we describe one of the bidding mechanisms enabling us to do so.
3.2.4 Bidding Mechanism in the Stock Market
The stock market collects the orders from buyers and sellers in each period, and then
generates only one price for each trading date.22 After comparing the expected payoﬀs
from risk-free asset and the stocks, young investors would like to hand in limit price order
in accordance with their beliefs. If all agents are truthful, agents with higher beliefs will
bid for a higher price. On the other hand, the sellers must submit a market price order
22This simplification makes the model more tractable. Actually this assumption, as well as the bidding
mechanism we describe here, is in line with the applications in some of over-the-counter (OTC) markets.
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because they have to sell all the stocks to enjoy their fruits in retirement.23
The market collects all the orders and determines the market price Pt such that the
number of shares from bidding orders above Pt equals S. With µ∗t indicating the cutoﬀ
belief for the marginal agents, the number of winning buyers is 1− F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st). Recall
that each agent has one unit of capital and the total market value of the company is
SPt at time t. Hence we obtain the market price as a function of cutoﬀ beliefs. It also
depends on all the inferred and observed signals.
Pt =
1− F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st)
S
, (3.6)
where
S = SP0 = 1− F (µ∗0;Ω0, s0). (3.7)
The winning buyers have to purchase the stock at a price of Pt, while the other young
investors would invest in the risk-free asset. Theoretically, we can solve µ∗t as a function
of Pt from (3.6)
µ∗t = ϕ(Pt;Ωt, st) = F
−1(1− SPt;Ωt, st) (3.8)
3.3 Bayesian Learning Equilibrium Pricing Process
3.3.1 General Results
For the marginal agent at time t, the expected gross rate of return on equity yt equates
the yield from risk-free assets,
yt =
Et[st+1 + Pt+1|µ∗t ]
Pt
=
µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µ∗t ,Ωt+1]
Pt
= R. (3.9)
Note that the number of shares per agent, S/[1 − F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st)], cancels out from the
numerator and denominator. The expectations are taken on both the states of nature θ
and the subsequent signals st. In the light of equation (3.6) and the approach to generate
23Since this market is essentially a limit-order market, there is no bid-ask spread due to the absence
of market makers.
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F (·;Ωt, st), we can multiply both sides by SPt, and rewrite equation (3.9) as
R[1− F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st)] = S[µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL] + 1−E[F (µ∗t+1;Ωt+1, st+1)|µ∗t ,Ωt+1] (3.10)
The left-hand side is the opportunity cost of the capitals invested in the stock market
in period t, while the right-hand side is the expected return from the dividends and the
expected market value of the stocks in period t+ 1.
Equation (3.8) and (3.10) characterize theBayesian learning equilibrium price (BLEP).24
Meanwhile, based on the present value approach, we can define
Vi =
θi
R− 1 , i = H,L,
and rewrite equation (3.9) as
Pt = [µ∗tVH + (1− µ∗t )VL] +
Et[Pt+1|µ∗t ,Ωt+1]− Pt
R− 1 . (3.11)
Comparing BLEP with the expected present value
V Et = µ
∗
tVH + (1− µ∗t )VL, (3.12)
we find that only when Pt = Et[Pt+1|µ∗t ,Ωt], i.e. when the expected capital gain is zero,
the price is exactly the expectation of the probable present values for the marginal stock
investors. However we can show below that the expected capital gain is actually non-zero
almost all the time.25
Note that, in a representative agent model, Et[µt+1|µt,Ωt+1] = µt due to the law of it-
erated expectations (LIE).While the EPV formula is linear in µt, we haveEt[Pt+1|µ∗t ,Ωt+1] =
Pt, which means the expected capital gain is zero. However, in an economy with hetero-
geneous beliefs, the prior beliefs of the marginal agents (who determine the stock prices)
would change over time, as illustrated in Lemma 1.
24Hereafter, we call these two equations as BLEP equations.
25The term “almost all the time” means that it is of measure zero for the expected capital gain to be
zero. The following terms with “almost ...” have similar meanings.
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Lemma 1: (ex post eﬀects) If the signal is in favor of the good (bad) state in period
t+ 1, i.e. st+1 is larger (smaller) than the mid point between θH and θL, then:
(i) there is a positive (negative) capital gain and more (less) stock investors;
(ii) the prior beliefs of marginal agents vary over time in almost all the cases;
(iii) cutoﬀ beliefs are higher (lower) than before.
Mathematically, results (i) and (ii) means that an encouraging (a discouraging) signal
implies
mt+1µ∗t
1 + (mt+1 − 1)µ∗t
> (<)µ∗t+1 > (<)µ
∗
t , (3.13)
where mt+1 = m(st+1) is the updating multiplier defined in equation (3.4).
Proof : All the proofs are relegated to Appendix B.
Since the LIE only applies to the same agent or agents with the same prior beliefs,
the argument in a representative agent model is no longer valid. Observe that, if EPV
were the solution of the BLEP equations, we could substitute equation (3.5) and (3.6)
into the asset pricing formula to obtain
1− F−1
Ã
µ∗t
Mˆt + (1− Mˆt)µ∗t
!
− µ∗tSVH − (1− µ∗t )SVL = 0.
and derive a solution µ∗t = µ
∗(Mˆt;S) as a result.26 Although the general form of F−1
makes rigorous proof diﬃcult, it is much easier to show that the necessary condition for
EPV to be the solution of BLEP equations, Et[µ∗t+1|µ∗t ,Ωt+1] = Et[µ∗(mt+1Mˆt)|Mˆt] = µ∗t
does not hold if F−1 takes some specific functional forms, including the one we assume
in the following subsection.
Proposition 1: (Deviation from EPV) In an economy with heterogeneous prior
beliefs, stock prices set by the marginal agents diﬀer from its EPV (conditional on the
cutoﬀ beliefs) by a nontrivial expected capital gain component almost all the time until
the announcement of true quality.
26Note that the left-hand side is decreasing in µ∗t , and increasing in Mˆt, µ
∗(Mˆt;S) is an increasing
fuction in Mˆt.
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Note that the additional expected capital gain term is a non-fundamental component
since its existence relies heavily on reselling the stock.27 Since speculators care much more
about expected capital gains rather than dividends, the presence of expected capital gain
component in the asset pricing formula makes our social learning framework a good
platform to analyze speculators’ behaviors.
3.3.2 Uniform Likelihood Ratio Distribution of Prior Beliefs
Assume that the likelihood ratio of prior belief, µ−1/(1 − µ−1), follows a uniform dis-
tribution on [0, b−1].28 As a consequence, the likelihood of the belief of generation t,
µt/(1− µt), is also uniformly distributed on the support of [0, bt]. We call this family of
distribution as uniform likelihood ratio distribution (ULR distribution). It enables us to
employ only one parameter to characterize F (·;Ωt, st)
F (µt;Ωt, st) =
µt
bt(1− µt)
. (3.14)
The corresponding probability density function (pdf) is given by
f(µt;Ωt, st) =
1
bt(1− µt)2
, (3.15)
and the upper bound of belief, or maximal belief, is
µmaxt =
bt
1 + bt
(3.16)
With the help of equation (3.2) and (3.4), we know that bt can be written as a function
27We don’t call it bubble (in a narrow sense), since there is no explosive associated with this type of
deviation from fundamental.
28We chose this family of distribution just to simplify the subsequent computation since it is closed un-
der belief updating. Theoretically, other families of single-parameter distributions can also be employed.
However, we believe that the qualitative results would not change.
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of estimated signals {sˆτ}t−1τ=0 and the latest signal st:
bt = b−1m(st)
t−1Y
τ=0
m(sˆτ) (3.17)
= b−1 exp
"
θH − θL
2σ2
[2st + 2
t−1X
τ=0
sˆt − (t+ 1)θH − (t+ 1)θL]
#
Note that we have one-to-one mapping between two sequences {Ωt ∪ {st}} and {bt}, and
one can easily infer the previous signals from the knowledge about the sequence {bt}.
Under the ULR distribution, we can rewrite equation (3.6) as
SPt = 1−
µ∗t
bt(1− µ∗t )
,
or
µ∗t =
bt(1− SPt)
1 + bt(1− SPt)
, (3.18)
with
lim
bt→0
µ∗t = 0; lim
bt→∞
µ∗t = 1.
Employing equation (3.18) and the no-arbitrage condition
RPt = [µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL] + µ∗tE[Pt+1|bt, θH ] + (1− µ∗t )E[Pt+1|bt, θL].
we can obtain the BLEP process, Pt = P (bt), from
RP (bt){1 + bt[1− SP (bt)]}− bt[1− SP (bt)]θH − θL (3.19)
=
Z +∞
−∞
P (bt+1,L)φ(st+1; θL, σ2)dst+1 + bt[1− SP (bt)]
Z +∞
−∞
P (bt+1,H)φ(st+1; θH , σ2)dst+1.
where the number of issued shares, S, is given by
R[1 + b0(1− S)]− b0(1− S)θH − θL
=
Z +∞
−∞
P (b1,L)φ(s1; θL, σ2)ds1 + b0(1− S)
Z +∞
−∞
P (b1,H)φ(s1; θH , σ2)ds1.
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Observe that the BLEP process characterized in equation (3.19) satisfies that
lim
bt→0
P (bt) = VL; lim
bt→∞
P (bt) = VH .
when SVH < 1.29 It means that, in the absence of uncertainty, equation (3.19) is identical
with the present value approach.
3.3.3 Numerical Solution
The analytic solution for equation (3.19) is diﬃcult to obtain. However, the numerical
solution can be computed based on the brute-force (or iteration) method using EPV
prices as the initial values on the right-hand side of equation 3.19. The explanation
is quite intuitive. Suppose that the investors expect that firm’s true quality would be
revealed after k periods, when the stock price should equal to its EPV. If the sequence
of price functions converges as k approaches to infinity, the limit function would be the
solution for the case that the true quality is never revealed. When k is finite, the price
function changes as k changes.
To compute the EPV pricing in a market with heterogeneous prior beliefs, we set
initially the stock price at the expected present value for the marginal investors. The
no-arbitrage condition is no longer eﬀective for calculating this initial function since we
have demonstrated that the EPV approach fails to be arbitrage-free.
While the IPO price P0 = 1, we can calculate µ∗0 from (3.12) and the EPV assumption
P0 = V E0 ,
µ∗0 =
1− VL
VH − VL
. (3.20)
As a result, we can use equations (3.7), and (3.14) to infer b0 from the volume of the
issued stock
b0 =
1− VL
(VH − 1)(1− S)
(3.21)
29This is likely to be the case in reality, where the market value of all stocks is always smaller than
capitals available.
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For the subsequent periods, we can equate the prices in (3.6) and (3.12) to obtain
1− F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st)
S
= µ∗tVH + (1− µ∗t )VL (3.22)
and then derive the relationship between bt and µ∗t with the help of equation (3.14).
Substituting µ∗t as a function of bt into equation (3.6) yields
SPt =
1
2
[1 + SVH +
1
bt
−
r
(1− 1
bt
− SVH)2 +
4
bt
(1− SVL)] (3.23)
µ∗t = 1−
2
(bt + 1− SVHbt) +
p
(bt + 1− SVHbt)2 + 4btS(VH − VL)
(3.24)
for t = 1, 2, . . .. We show in Appendix A that both Pt and µ∗t are increasing in bt.
With the above initial pricing function, we calculate the numerical results with pa-
rameter values of R = 1.01, VH = 1.8, VL = 0.6, b0 = 1, S = 0.5, σ = (θH − θL)/q and
q = 1. Note that the return of the risk-free assets is close to quarterly or semiannual
risk-free return in the States, we can interpret each period as 3 or 6 months. This is
also in line with the quarterly or semiannual reporting requirements for listing firms.
In this example, the signals are quite rough since the probability of misleading signals
is just 0.4085 if we employ the middle point of θH and θL as the critical point. The
iteration method provides a reasonable convergence rate for the pricing function. For
instance, after 30 iterations, the supnorm distance between adjacent pricing functions is
only 1.3001× 10−5, while stock prices range from 0.6 to 1.8.
Figures 3.2 and 3.3 illustrate the relationship between EPV and BLEP. We can find
that the EPV approach would underprice the stock as much as 5.15% of the BLEP when
the firm is widely believed to be good and overprices it as much as 2.14% when the most
investors are pessimistic. The ratios are quite substantial compared with the risk-free
rate.
Based on this result, we can have some idea about the dynamics of stock prices. Note
that bt will change over time since it is based on the realization of the random signal st.
When the firm is of a good (bad) quality, its stock prices would be more likely to stay
higher (lower) than its EPV until the truth is revealed. In this case, we can observe a
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sustained deviation from the stock’s EPV, as illustrated in the example in figure 3.4. This
result agrees with the phenomena of sustained high prices during the bubble period and
seemingly endless low prices in a bearish market. Intuitively, if the marginal investors
believe that the quality of the firm is good (bad), the signal in the subsequent period is
more likely be encouraging (discouraging). Hence he would expect a capital gain (loss),
which explains the sustained deviation.
Observe that the deviation from EPV is biggest when there is a widespread rumor in
the market rather than the announcement of the truth. The reason lies in the fact that
when buying at a price quite close to, for instance, VH , the surprisingly adverse news
could lead to a larger expected loss even when the probability is small, since the price
drops would be quite drastic, which is similar to the black sheep eﬀect in other learning
literature, such as Chamley (2003b, page 73). Proposition 2 summarizes the findings so
far.
Proposition 2: (Sustained Deviation from EPV) There exist sustained deviations
from EPV in finite periods. Widespread rumors in the market give rise to larger devia-
tions.
3.3.4 Signaling Noises
A noteworthy remark is that the quality of signal would greatly change results quanti-
tatively, although not qualitatively. Recall that the standard deviation of noise is set as
σ = (θH−θL)/q, which means the two true states are q standard deviations apart. Hence
we have a signal with better quality if q is large. When the signals are rather accurate
with q = 4, investors are less confused by the signals, and thus stock prices are not far
from the corresponding EPVs. Actually, when q approaches to infinity, the agents know
the true type each period, and there is no deviation from the EPVs. When the signals
are less informative with q = 1/4, the investors cannot have a good anticipation about
the subsequent signals, the expected capital gain component is also small. Extremely,
when q tends to zero, the variance of the signal σ2 approaches to infinity, and the signal
is of no use any more. In this case Et[Pt+1|µ∗t ,Ωt+1] = Pt, and the BLEP converges to
the EPV. figure 3.5 demonstrate how the price deviation changes with the quality of the
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signals.
In addition, the quality of signaling noises would also aﬀect the convergence rate
toward the truth. figure 3.6 demonstrates the square root of mean squared errors (RMSE)
of the maximal beliefs based on a simulation with 1000 replications. It takes only 5 period
for RMSE to fall below 10−4 when q = 4, 15 periods when q = 2, and 58 periods when
q = 1. In the cases of q = 1/2 and 1/4, the RMSE is still as high as 0.0770 and 0.2656
respectively after 100 periods. If we take a period as 3 or 6 months, the convergence rate
for q < 1 is fairly slow (about 20 years).
3.3.5 Speculative Manipulation
Equation (3.23) essentially provides a pricing function Pt = P (bt). We have shown
that this function is strictly increasing. This provides us an opportunity to study the
possibility of speculative manipulation. The t-generation agents with a belief just below
the cutoﬀ may consider submitting a higher bidding price in an attempt to pretend that
the signal is better than it actually is. Through Bayesian learning, the next generation
would like to oﬀer a higher price. In short, these investors can sell the stocks at a higher
price in the subsequent period, but they have to bid up their purchasing price to disguise
the quality of the firm. This is similar to the feedback loop, an important eﬀect in creating
speculative bubbles suggested by Shiller (2000). Previous explanations of this eﬀect rely
either on adaptive expectation or some psychological factors, such as overconfidence,
which need to relax individual rationality. However, it can be easily justified in this
social learning framework.
Suppose the agents manage to create an illusion that the highest belief is bt+ δ. The
expected yield becomes
ySPt =
µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL
P (bt + δ)
+
Et{P [(bt + δ)m(st+1)]|µ∗t ,Ωt}
P (bt + δ)
. (3.25)
The first term captures the dilution eﬀect, where the expected rate of return from divi-
dends is diluted by the higher purchasing price. The second term represents the capital
gain eﬀect. The dilution eﬀect is obviously negative, but the capital gain eﬀect is gener-
ally ambiguous depending on the property of the price function. We have feedback loops,
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because an increase in current prices would make the subsequent generation adjust their
beliefs upward and thus raise the prices in the next period. However, whether it is prof-
itable to manipulate the stock prices in this manner depends crucially on the gains from
a higher stock price in the next period net of the costs from bidding up current price.
figure 3.7 shows that, the dilution eﬀect is unsurprisingly negative, but rather small
in magnitude; moreover, under the current settings, the capital gain eﬀect turns out to
be negative as well, which means the costs of speculative manipulations are bigger than
its gains. Thus, while we do identify feedback loops, it is not strong enough to grant the
speculative manipulations profitable. The results are summarized in Proposition 3.
Proposition 3: (Speculative Manipulation) In the benchmark setting, feedback loops
cannot lead to profitable speculative manipulations.
With negative profits, one cannot justify the existence of speculative manipulations.
An possible explanation is that investors can have signals as good in quality as the
preceding ones, hence they are less likely to be fooled. Another reason is that the changes
in the beliefs by bidding up the prices is small relative to the costs. If we change the
assumption about the signaling noises, speculative manipulations could be profitable.
Section 4 provides an example in this direction.
An immediate implication from Proposition 3 is that stock prices would perfectly
reveal previous signals since no one would manipulate the stock prices. Due to the one-to-
one mapping from maximal beliefs to stock prices, we can infer the history of beliefs from
the records of stock prices, and hence figure out all the previous signals. Actually, with
continuous and unbounded actions and only one dimension of signals, previous signals
would be perfectly inferred, as pointed out by Avery and Zemsky (1998). Nonetheless,
we still find sustained stock price deviations from EPV, which is more remarkable given
perfect learning.
In fact, the deviation from EPV stems from the treatment of corporate earnings as
signals, instead of truth. The conceived data generation process changes with the beliefs,
while other works, such as the experiments on estimation-based asset pricing model by
Timmermann (1996), rested on the ex ante belief that the conceived data generation
process is stationary, although it changes with time ex post.
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There are at least two ways to make learning imperfect and lead to signal distortions:
one is to limit the fluctuation in the stock prices, and another is to increase the dimension
of signals. We will show that, in at least one situation, speculative manipulations are
profitable, which leads to endogenous noises within the system.
3.4 Signal Distortions
3.4.1 Stock Markets with Fluctuation Limits
In several emerging markets, fluctuation limits are introduced to avoid drastic changes
in stock prices.30 In the baseline model, stock prices completely reveal the signals. In
contrast, we only have partial revelation when stock price hits the limit. The boundedness
in prices turns out to be important to make the speculative manipulations profitable.
For simplicity and illustrative purposes, only limit-ups are considered here.31 With
limit-ups, stock exchange generates the prices according to the formula
Pt = min{1− F (µ
∗
t ;Ωt, st)
S
, λPt−1}, (3.26)
where λ is one plus the fluctuation limits for price rises. When the stock price hits the
upper limit λPt−1, each investor can only invest a proportion αt of his capital endowment,
where
αt =
SλPt−1
1− F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st)
.
The remaining 1 − αt would be invested in the risk-free asset. Assume that αt is not
30The fluctuation limit is also called as daily price limit or daily trading limit, which stipulates that
the stock prices can only fluctuate daily within a band computed based on the previous closing prices.
It is more widely employed in futures markets as well as in many stock markets, including those in
Japan, Korea, Mainland China, Taiwan, Malaysia, Thailand, Mexico, Austria, Belgium, France, Greece,
Italy, Netherlands, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey. Most of them are listed in Roll (1989). As one of the
largest stock markets in the world, Tokyo Stock Exchange imposes daily price limits in an eﬀort to
prevent “excessively violent price fluctuations due to an imbalance in the buy/sell equilibrium or due to
speculative trading.”
31Limit-ups are referred to the limits for price rises, and limit-downs means the limit for price drops.
In a stock market with limit-downs, at least some stock holders fail to sell all of their stocks, and have to
sell the remaining in the subsequent trading day. Hence it requires a multi-period (at least three-period)
overlapping generation framework, which makes the model more complicated without much contribution.
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recorded, which is in line with the practice of the emerging stock markets mentioned
above. When the stock price is exactly at the limit-up level, we can compute the threshold
value of the cutoﬀ beliefs as
µupt = F
−1(1− SλPt−1;Ωt, st).
For simplicity, we again assume that the likelihood ratio is uniformly distributed.
Then we have
SPt = min{1− µ
∗
t
bt(1− µ∗t )
, SλPt−1},
where the price function in this case depends not only on bt but also on Pt−1. We know
that better current signal leads to a higher stock price. Hence, as long as λPt−1 < VH ,
there exist a threshold value of current signal supt such that the price his the limit-up
level if and only if st ≥ supt . As a result, when st < supt , Pt and µ∗t satisfies
µ∗t =
bt(1− SPt)
1 + bt(1− SPt)
and
µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µ∗t , bt]
Pt
= R;
when st ≥ supt , we have
Pt = λPt−1
and
µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µ∗t , b˜t]
λPt−1
= R.
Observe that we use b˜t instead of bt in the second case, since the limit-up price results in
signal distortion. When stock price hits the upper bound, subsequent generation fails to
observe the true signal. All they can infer is the probabilities for stock prices to hit the
upper limit when firm is of good or bad quality. Therefore the updating multiplier turns
out to be
m˜(supt ) =
1− Φ(supt ; θH , σ2)
1− Φ(supt ; θL, σ2)
,
where Φ is the Gaussian cdf.
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From the model, we can find that stock prices hitting fluctuation limits would distort
the revelation of private signals. More specifically, since m(supt ) < m˜(s
up
t ) for Gaussian
distribution,32 the perceived signal has an upward bias when the true signal is close to
supt . In the case when the true signal is lower but suﬃciently close to s
up
t , some investors
can pretend that they have received supt instead of the true signal in an eﬀort to make
use of the upward bias, which makes speculative manipulations more profitable than the
baseline model.
figure 3.8 illustrates the region of profitable speculative manipulations when current
signal is slightly below the level to make the price hit the fluctuation limit. Since the
diﬀerence between the would-be price without speculative manipulations and the upper
limit is small, the manipulation cost is low. However, the gains from the manipulations
would be quite substantial when the previous price is low as a result of the large magnitude
of the upward bias. Numerically, we do find the region, as shown in figure 3.8, for the
speculative manipulations to be profitable. We summarize the result in Proposition 4.
Proposition 4: (Active Speculative Manipulation) With fluctuation limits, there
exist cases in which the speculative manipulations are profitable.
Note that these emerging markets initially introduce the fluctuation limits for the
purpose of reducing the possibility of speculations. While achieving this purpose within
a trading day, it could may turn out to encourage speculative manipulations over a longer
period of time.
3.4.2 Financial Frenzies
We next introduce animal spirits in such a way that a proportion (1−Nt) of young agents
at period t, would always invest in the stock markets regardless of the signals received
(the remaining agents of proportion Nt behave the same as before). The proportion Nt
has the value of n with probability π, and equals 1 otherwise. The distribution of frenzied
agents is assumed independent of the prior beliefs. While the realization of Nt is private
information, its distribution is public knowledge. Note that we now have two-dimensional
32It is based on the fact that the hazard rate, φ(x)1−Φ(x) , is increasing for Gaussian distribution.
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signaling noises, but have only a single dimensional action reflected by stock price. The
additional noises lead to signal distortion.33
For simplicity, we employ the uniform likelihood ratio distribution again. With finan-
cial frenzies, the measure of normal agents becomes
F (µt;Ωt, st, Nt) =
Ntµt
bt(1− µt)
.
Stock exchange now generates the stock price given by
SPt = 1−
Ntµ∗t
bt(1− µ∗t )
, (3.27)
and the no-arbitrage condition becomes
µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µ∗t , b˜t]
Pt
= R. (3.28)
Note that the subsequent agents can only figure out that the value of the updating
multiplier is m(st)/Nt. Since they do not know the value of Nt, they must consider both
cases, and infer two possible signals snt and s
1
t , where
m(snt ;Nt) =
nm(st)
Nt
, m(s1t ;Nt) =
m(st)
Nt
As a consequence, the perceived updating multiplier changes to
m˜(snt , s
1
t ) =
πφ(snt ; θH , σ
2) + (1− π)φ(s1t ; θH , σ2)
πφ(snt ; θL, σ2) + (1− π)φ(s1t ; θL, σ2)
.
Note that the diﬀerence between perceived updating multiplier, m˜(snt , s
1
t ), and the
one based on true signals, m(st), leads to signal distortions in the learning process. The
reason lies in the fact that the mapping from two-dimensional signaling noises to the one-
dimensional stock prices fails to be one-to-one. figure 3.9 shows that the signal distortions
33We can also introduce financial distress analogously. For example, we can assume that a fraction
of agents would always stay away from the stock market whatever signal he receives. However, it is a
bit more complicated since we have to adjust the total shares available to rational agents, while in the
financial distress model, nt only appears in the cumulative ditribution function.
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caused by financial frenzies slow down the convergence. Similar to the baseline model,
we can obtain the BLEP process from equation (3.27) and (3.28) by substituting out µ∗t .
However, in this case, the signal distortions are not large enough to make the speculative
manipulations profitable. Proposition 5 summarizes the results.
Proposition 5: (Slower Convergence) The introduction of financial frenzies results
in signal distortions, which slow down the rate of convergence toward the truth.
In reality, we could possibly have ten or more dimensions of signaling noises, which
would make the convergence rate even lower, and lengthen the period of sustained de-
viations from EPV. This may help explain why the stocks would deviate from their
fundamental values as long as two decades.
3.5 Conclusion
In this paper we establish an overlapping generations model with Bayesian learning about
the listed firm’s quality, and find that the arbitrage-free prices can have sustained devia-
tion from the related EPVs. In a bullish market, the stocks are priced higher than that
implied by the present value of subsequent dividend flows. During the recession, we can
find sustained existence of underpriced stocks.
Since we find that speculative manipulations can be profitable at least in the case
with fluctuation limits, the subsequent agents would take this endogenous noises into
account. In the our model, it would not change much in the region of signals leading to
upper limits, however, it would be interesting and important in other cases.
Moreover, there could be other types of signal distortions making speculative ma-
nipulations profitable. Possible candidates include changing the binary animal spirit
model into a continuous one. However, it takes much longer to compute double integrals
numerically.
We can also change the informational structure in the baseline model. For example,
the introduction of partial access to the signals would slow down the convergence rate
of cutoﬀ beliefs toward the truth. A three-period overlapping generations settings would
greatly enrich the analysis of stock market behaviors. In contrast to the passive selling
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from the old investors in current model, we would have more elastic supply since the mid-
aged investors can choose whether to hold or sell. The idea is close to the occupational
choice model proposed by Banerjee and Newman (1993). We expect that the increase in
the dimension of strategy space provides more room for speculative manipulations. Some
of the preliminary works are shown in Appendix B.
The consideration of more than one firms or stock markets is another interesting
extension for this paper. If there is some correlation among the realized signals of the
firms, investors would update their beliefs of one firm based on the stock price perfor-
mance of other firms. As a consequence, there will be substantial comovements among
diﬀerent stocks or stock markets, which is in line with the observation of the stock market
performance and help us understand the mechanism of financial contagions.
Providing the first asset pricing formula including a non-trivial expected capital gain
component, our framework is more suitable for future studies on the impacts from taxes
on capital gain. It seems that this kind of taxes would discourage positive deviations
from fundamentals in a booming market, but enhance the negative devations in a bear-
ish market. However the impact from a progressive capital gain taxes demands more
thorough studies.
More generally, we can employ the social learning framework to revisit the adap-
tive expectation literature. In fact, adaptive expectation can be regarded as one of the
short-memory learning processes. By doing so, we can find more applications for social
learnings.
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Appendix
A. Possible Extensions of the Model
In the above model, the complete access to the signals discourages the possibility
of speculative manipulations. Hence, one of the interesting extensions would be the
imposition of partial access to the signals. We expect the convergence rate to be much
slower, and the speculative manipulations to be more likely.
Another concern of the main model is the forced selling for the old generation. If we
extend the model to a three-period overlapping generations framework, it would be more
close to reality.
A1. Partial Access to the Signals
The major diﬀerence from the baseline model is that the young agents has a probabil-
ity πt to observe the signals, while the uninformed agents would have a belief µNt = µˆt−1.
As a result, the number of winning buyers is πt[1 − F (µS∗t ;Ωt−1, st)] + (1 − πt)[1 −
F (µN∗t ;Ωt−1)], where µ
N∗
t and µ
S∗
t stand for the beliefs of marginal agents in each group
respectively. Recall that each agent has one unit of capital and the total market value of
the company is SPt at time t. Hence we obtain the market price as a function of cutoﬀ
belief. It also depends on the FNt and F
S
t .
Pt(µ∗t ;σt+1) =
πt[1− F (µS∗t ;Ωt−1, st)] + (1− πt)[1− F (µN∗t ;Ωt−1)]
S
, (A1)
where
S = SP0 = π0[1− F (µS∗0 ; s0)] + (1− π0)[1− F (µN∗0 ;Ω0)] (A2)
Now we have no-arbitrage condition for each type of agents
yt =
µS∗t θH + (1− µS∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µS∗t ,Ωt−1, st]
Pt
= R, (A3)
and
yt =
µN∗t θH + (1− µN∗t )θL +Et[Pt+1|µN∗t ,Ωt−1]
Pt
= R. (A4)
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If we assume the likelihood ratio to be uniformly distributed, then
SPt = SP (bt; bt−1) = πt
∙
1− µ
S∗
t
bt(1− µS∗t )
¸
+ (1− πt)
∙
1− µ
N∗
t
bt−1(1− µN∗t )
¸
(A5)
We can obtain the relationship between the two cutoﬀ beliefs
(µS∗t − µN∗t )(θH − θL)
= µN∗t Et[P (bt+1; bt)|bt−1, θH ] + (1− µN∗t )Et[P (bt+1; bt)|bt−1, θL] (A6)
−µS∗t Et[P (bt+1; bt)|bt, θH ]− (1− µS∗t )Et[P (bt+1; bt)|bt, θL]
Theoretically, we can solve the µS∗t and µ
N∗
t from (A5) and (3.29) and then put them
back to either (A3) or (A4) to solve the BLEP process. However it is even more diﬃcult
to solve this model.
A2. Three-Period Overlapping Generations Framework
Assume that each agent will live for three period, young, adult and old. While they
are born with an endowment of one unit of capital and only consume at the end of the
third period, they invest when young, modify their investment portfolio when adult, and
sell all assets when old.
At period 0, the listed firm issues new shares to the young and adult investors, hence
S = SP0 = [1− F (µ∗0,0;Ω0)] +R[1− F (µ∗−1,0;Ω0)]
= (1 +R)
∙
1−
µ∗0,0
b0(1− µ∗0,0)
¸
where the two cutoﬀ beliefs, µS∗0,0 and µ
S∗
−1,0, are equal, since the expected price in the
next period are the same. We also impose the assumption of uniform distribution for the
likelihood ratio. Here the first subscript stands for the birth date of the agent, while the
second one indicates the current period.
A good way to obtain the stock market clearing condition is to imagine that the adults
sell all the shares and then make their portfolio decision again. Now the market value of
the stocks is given by the young and adult agents’ stock investment. To the adult agents,
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if the number of investors increases, i.e. 1 −
µ∗t−1,t
bt(1− µ∗t−1,t)
> 1 −
µ∗t−1,t−1
bt−1(1− µ∗t−1,t−1)
, the
previous stock holders would invest all the capital gains and the dividends in stocks,
while the previous depositors (risk-free asset holders) would also invest their deposits.
This implies
SPt = 1−
µ∗t,t
bt(1− µ∗t,t)
+
Pt + st
Pt−1
∙
1−
µ∗t−1,t−1
bt−1(1− µ∗t−1,t−1)
¸
+R
∙
µ∗t−1,t−1
bt−1(1− µ∗t−1,t−1)
−
µ∗t−1,t
bt(1− µ∗t−1,t)
¸
.
Otherwise, we have only a portion of previous stock holders investing in the stock market
again, which means
SPt = 1−
µ∗t,t
bt(1− µ∗t,t)
+
Pt + st
Pt−1
∙
1−
µ∗t−1,t
bt(1− µ∗t−1,t)
¸
Obviously, the model is much more complicated.
B. Proofs and Derivations
Proof of Lemma 1: When there is an encouraging (discouraging) signal, every one would
be more (less) optimistic than before. First, there would be more (less) demand if the
stock price were the same. As a result, the stock prices would be higher (lower) and there
is a positive (negative) capital gain. Due to the assumption on capital endowment, higher
(lower) stock price implies more (less) stock investors. Note that the previous marginal
agents are indiﬀerent between buying stocks and investing in the risk-free asset. Since the
stock price would be higher (lower) after the arrival of new signal, the rate of return from
stock investment would be smaller (larger). Therefore, agents with the same posterior
beliefs as the previous marginal guys would invest in the risk-free asset (buy stock), and
the new cutoﬀ beliefs would be higher (lower) than before. Mathematically, the first
result implies 1 − F (µ∗t+1;Ωt+1, st+1) > (<)1 − F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st), and the second one means
µ∗t+1 > (<)µ
∗
t . Due to the belief updating mechanism describe in equation (3.2), we have
F (µ∗t ;Ωt, st) = F
³
mt+1µ∗t
1+(mt+1−1)µ∗t
;Ωt+1, st+1
´
, since the t-generation agent with a posterior
belief of µ∗t would have the same prior belief as the t+1-generation agent with a posterior
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belief of mt+1µ
∗
t
1+(mt+1−1)µ∗t
. With the above knowledge, we can derive inequality (3.13) easily.
Q.E.D.
The brute-force (iteration) method to solve the BLEP process:
Consider the mapping T from bounded continuous function to itself satisfying
(TP k)(bt) =
[µ∗t θH + (1− µ∗t )θL] + µ∗tE[P k(bt+1)|bt, θH ] + (1− µ∗t )E[P k(bt+1)|bt, θL]
R
where
µ∗t =
bt[1− S(TP k)(bt)]
1 + bt[1− S(TP k)(bt)]
.
We choose p0 as the EPV price function (3.23), and compute pk recursively. While
the convergence rate for the sequence {pk} is quite fast, the numerical solution for the
BLEP is easy to obtain.
The derivation of equation (3.23):
From equations (3.22) and (3.14), we have
1− µ
∗
t
bt(1−µ∗t )
= S[µ∗tVH + (1− µ∗t )VL]
For computational convenience, we can define
a∗t =
µ∗t
1−µ∗t
and get
1− a
∗
t
bt
= S[a
∗
tVH
1+a∗t
+ VL
1+a∗t
]
or
0 = S[a∗tVH + VL]− (1−
a∗t
bt
)(1 + a∗t )
= (a
∗
t )
2
bt
− (1− 1bt − SVH)a
∗
t + SVL − 1
Note that S < 1, and VL < 1, the quadratic equation has two real roots with diﬀerent
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signs. While only the positive root is meaningful here, we have
a∗t =
1
2
(bt − 1− SVHbt) +
1
2
p
(bt − 1− SVHbt)2 + 4bt(1− SVL)
Putting it into (3.6) yields
SPt = 1− a
∗
t
bt
= 1
2
h
1 + SVH + 1bt −
q
(1− 1bt − SVH)2 +
4
bt
(1− SVL)
i
= 1
2
h
1 + SVH + 1bt −
q
(1 + 1bt − SVH)2 +
4S
bt
(VH − VL)
i
with
lim
bt→∞
SPt = min{1, SVH}.
We can rewrite the expression as
SPt =
2btSVH+2SVL
bt+btSVH+1+
√
(1+bt−btSVH)2+4btS(VH−VL)
,
and thus obtain
lim
bt→0
SPt = SVL.
Defining
xt = 1bt ,
we have
d(SPt)
dxt
= 1− 2(x−1+SVH)+4(1−SVL)
2
√
(1−x−SVH)2+4x(1−SVL)
< 0
because
(1− x− SVH)2 + 4x(1− SVL)− [(x− 1 + SVH) + 2(1− SVL)]2
= 4x(1− SVL)− 4(x− 1 + SVH)(1− SVL)− 4(1− SVL)2
= 4x(1− SVL)(SVL − SVH) < 0.
Hence Pt is strictly increasing in bt. When bt tends to infinity, SPt goes to min{1, SVH};
when bt tends to zero, SPt goes to SVL.
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In addition, we can compute the belief of a marginal investor
µ∗t =
a∗t
1+a∗t
= 1− 1
1+a∗t
= 1− 2
(bt+1−SVHbt)+
√
(bt−1−SVHbt)2+4bt(1−SVL)
= 1− 2
(bt+1−SVHbt)+
√
(bt+1−SVHbt)2+4btS(VH−VL)
= 1−
√
(bt+1−SVHbt)2+4btS(VH−VL)−(bt+1−SVHbt)
2btS(VH−VL)
with
lim
bt→0
µ∗t = 0; lim
bt→∞
µ∗t =
⎧
⎨
⎩
1 if SVH < 1
1−SVL
S(VH−VL) if SVH ≥ 1
and µ∗t strictly increasing in bt.
A numerical example
Let
PLt+1 =
Z +∞
−∞
P (bt+1,L)φ(st+1; θL, σ2)dst+1, PHt+1 =
Z +∞
−∞
P (bt+1,H)φ(st+1; θH , σ2)dst+1
we have
RP (bt){1 + bt[1− SP (bt)]}− bt[1− SP (bt)]θH − θL
= PLt+1 + bt[1− SP (bt)]PHt+1.
Then
RbtSP 2t − Pt(R+Rbt + btSθH + btSPHt+1) + θL + PLt+1 + btPHt+1 + btθH = 0
When Pt = 0, the left hand side is positive. When Pt = 1/S, the left hand side is
Rbt − (R+Rbt + btθHS + btPHt+1S) + SθL + SPLt+1 + btSPHt+1 + btSθH
= −R+ SθL + SPLt+1 < −R+ θL + 1 < 0
since S < 1, SPLt+1 < 1, and θL < R − 1. Hence there is one root in (0, 1/S) with
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another in (1/S,∞). Obviously only the smaller one is reasonable, since the other leads
to SPt > 1.
To figure out the number of shares, S, just set P (b0) = 1, which results in
R{1 + b0[1− S]}− b0[1− S]θH − θL
= PL1 + b0[1− S]PH1 .
S = 1− R− θL − P
L
1
b0(θH + PH1 −R)
.
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CHAPTER IV 
 
A WAVELET ANALYSIS ON PATTERNS OF 
STOCK MARKET COMOVEMENTS 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The excess comovement between international stock markets is among the intriguing 
puzzles in finance. Based on the seminal work of Lucas (1978), stock prices are believed to be 
determined by fundamental factors. However the empirical evidence suggests the existence of 
non-fundamental factors in stock pricing. 
Among all the fundamental factors, the discounted present value of the dividend flow may 
be the most important one. Shiller (1989) constructs the fundamental value of a stock 
accordingly and discovers that the (detrended) US and UK stock indices exhibit excess 
comovement, by comparing their covariance with that of the fundamental values. A bigger set of 
fundamental factors, including interest rates, exchange rates, inflation, GNP or industrial 
production, etc., is adopted later. Among them, Pindyck and Rotemberg (1993) find excess 
comovements in the OLS residuals for firms with unrelated earnings, even after controlling the 
expectations of GNP growth and inflation. King, Sentana and Wadhwani (1994) employ a 
GARCH-based multifactor model on stock markets in 16 developed economies. Only a small 
proportion of the stock market comovements can be accounted for macroeconomic indicators. 
Ideally, we can isolate the non-fundamental factors by controlling other fundamental 
factors, such as tax rates of dividend income and capital gains, the creation of new investment 
tools, etc. However, the increase in the number of those factors would undermine statistical 
significance of the results. Moreover, some of the effects may be non-linear and will consume 
more data to control it correctly. In contrast to the direct study mentioned above, we propose an 
indirect approach based on wavelet analysis. 
Wavelet filters enables us to decompose the original data across time scales, such
as bi-daily, weekly, monthly, quarterly, semiannual, annual, etc., with a nice energy
preservation property such that the sum of the variances of component series equals
to that of the original data. The stock price changes due to transitory shocks will
be contained in the high-frequency components (i.e. bi-daily or weekly), while those
caused by perminant shocks are captured in the low-frequency components (i.e. quarterly,
semiannual or annual). As a result, we can employ wavelet analysis to study the pattern
of the comovements across the scales, and obtain some idea about what kind of shocks
are the main driving forces of stock market comovements.
This paper is among the first few papers that employ wavelet analysis to investi-
gate both the existence and the patterns of excess comovements across time scales. The
basic idea comes from the observation that the fundamental changes usually have more
sustained eﬀects while the transitory shocks would decay much faster. The major compo-
nents of non-fundamental factors, such as signaling noises and expectation errors usually
disappear after the related true information is revealed publicly.1 For instance, after the
firms announce their earning, or the Fed decides the primary interest rate, the related
rumors would have no eﬀect on stock prices any more.
The recent development in wavelet analysis, a useful tool in signal process, helps
us to disentangle transitory shocks (high frequency components) from sustained eﬀects
(low frequency ingredients).2 By making use of econometric knowledge in both time and
frequency domain, wavelet analysis enables us to decompose a time series over diﬀerent
time scales. The component time series at each time scale level captures the changes in a
specific frequency range, based on the spectral features of wavelet filters. Meanwhile, we
can still use time series techniques to each component series. Percival and Walden (2000)
provide a good introduction to wavelet analysis, while Gençay, Selçuk and Whitcher
1Before the announcement of true information, we may have some signals about it, and the signaling
error would lead to excessive price fluctuation. In addition, investors would observe signal related actions
(or stock price changes) to update their beliefs. We regard the ineﬃciency in discovering the signals as
expectation errors.
2In this paper, the sustained (long term) eﬀect focuses on a period longer than a quarter, since most of
macroeconomic indicators and corporate earnings are announced quarterly. The transitory (short-run)
shocks capture the fluctuation in a period less than one month, because the most frequent announcement
is made monthly.
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(2002) and Ramsey (2000) exhibit some of its applications in finance and economics.
Basically, we focus on the correlation coeﬃcients at each scale level, but the results from
measures of nonlinear interdependence, such as Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s rho, are
qualitatively similar.
Empirical results on the US and Eastern Asian markets show that the correlation
coeﬃcients do vary across time scales, and short-run comovements are all significantly
positive except for the closed markets in Mainland China, which are literally inert to
foreign stock markets at most time scales. Long-term correlation is more remarkable
than short-run ones in domestic markets with similar sectoral structure, while monthly
and quarterly changes in Japanese, Hong Kong and Taiwan markets are more sensitive
to the US counterparts than other scale levels. The degree of comovements is increasing
in the openness of the markets.
Another appealing objective is the comovements of Chinese B-share markets with
other markets in Greater China, because they are not oﬃcially open to Chinese mainland
investors until 2001 while other Greater Chinese investors can buy B shares all the times.
Hence, it provides a good sample to demonstrate our observation on the relationship
between the level of comovements and the market openness.
Other empirical studies short-run comovements (daily or intraday) support our find-
ings. Becker, Finnerty and Gupta (1990) find that the intraday returns in S&P500 can
aﬀect the performance of Nikkei index in the following trading period, but the other direc-
tion is much weaker and less significant. Controlling a bunch of information variables in
their GARCH model, Karolyi and Stulz (1996) demonstrate that neither macroeconomic
announcements nor interest shocks can be accounted for comovements between US and
Japanese stock returns, while previous market performance has significant explanatory
power to stock comovements. Among the few papers introducing wavelet analysis to the
studies on stock market comovements, Lee (2001) employ wavelet regression to show the
spillover from developed stock markets in US, Japan, German to the emerging markets
in Turkey and Egypt in the short run (less than a week).
This paper contributes to the related literature by illustrating the whole pattern of
stock market comovements over time scales, which generates a more vivid picture about
the interaction among the international stock markets. As to the technical comparison
95
with Lee (2001), we focus on wavelet correlations and some measures of nonlinear inter-
dependence, while Lee (2001) employs wavelet OLS regression. In addition, we employ
MODWT filters rather than DWT ones, because the former is shown to insensitive to
circular shifts.3
The paper is organized as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the MODWT method, and
while the empirical results is presented in Section 4.3. Section 4.4 concludes. The sources
and manipulations of the data can be found in Appendix.
4.2 DiscreteWavelet Transform as a FilteringMethod
A general introduction of continuous and discrete wavelet analysis can be found in Per-
cival and Walden (2000). In this paper, we employ the maximal overlap discrete wavelet
transform (MODWT) as a filtering method. Hence a brief introduction of MODWT is
provided in this section. Compared with other detrending methods, MODWT filter has
additional features, such as scale-by-scale energy-preserving decomposition and better
interpretation in the language of spectral analysis.
4.2.1 MODWT Filters
Moving average and diﬀerencing are among the commonly used detrending or filtering
methods. The first order diﬀerencing is identical to the filtering by {−1, 1}, while the
filter for the second order diﬀerencing is {1,−2, 1}. In general, all the diﬀerencing filters
with a length of L, {hl}L−1l=0 , satisfy
L−1X
l=0
hl = 0. (4.1)
3Another approach similar to wavelet analysis is the band spectrum regression proposed by Engle
(1974). While the band spectrum regression is based on Fourier transform, we use the whole data set to
compute each element in the filtered data. In contrast, wavelet analysis has better localization property
since we only need the data in a small neighborhood to calculate each wavelet (or scaling) coeﬃcient.
This property enables us to associate the changes in the filtered data with the original one. Moreover,
wavelet filtering method only requires local stationarity, while Fourier transform demands a global one.
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Similarly, the general (weighted) moving average filter with a length of L, {gl}Ll=1, satisfy
L−1X
l=0
gl = 1. (4.2)
Accordingly, a MODWT wavelet filter is a general diﬀerencing filter satisfying the
half-energy condition
L−1X
l=0
h2l =
1
2
, (4.3)
and the orthogonality condition for even shifts
L−1X
l=0
hlhl+2n =
∞X
l=−∞
hlhl+2n = 0, for any non-zero integer n. (4.4)
The corresponding MODWT scaling filter is generated from the wavelet filter by
gl = (−1)l+1hL−1−l. (4.5)
Percival and Walden (2000) demonstrated that this scaling filter is essentially a general
moving average filter satisfying the half-energy condition
L−1X
l=0
g2l =
1
2
, (4.6)
and the orthogonality condition for even shifts
L−1X
l=0
glgl+2n =
∞X
l=−∞
glgl+2n = 0, for any non-zero integer n. (4.7)
4.2.2 Pyramid Algorithm
With MODWT filters, we can generate MODWT wavelet and scaling coeﬃcients at scale
1, {W1,t}N−1t=0 and {V1,t}N−1t=0 , from the original series, {Xt}˙
N−1
t=0
W1,t =
L−1X
l=0
hlXt−lmodN , for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, (4.8)
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V1,t =
LX
l=1
glXt−lmodN , for t = 0, . . . , N − 1. (4.9)
Note that MODWT employs circular convolution. The notation amodN means that,
when the integer a ∈ [kN, kN + N − 1], amodN equals a − kN , for any integer k.
Obviously, MODWT coeﬃcients generated by both beginning and ending components
could be spurious. Hence, we will adjust the boundary-aﬀected coeﬃcients later.
Analogously, we can decompose the scaling coeﬃcients to obtain MODWT coeﬃcients
at higher scales,
Wj,t =
L−1X
l=0
hlVj−1,t−2j−1lmodN , for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, (4.10)
Vj,t =
L−1X
l=0
glVj−1,t−2j−1lmodN , for t = 0, . . . , N − 1. (4.11)
Consequently, we will have all the MODWT coeﬃcients, {W1, . . . ,WJ ,VJ}4, up to scale
J . We can easily reconstruct the original series from the MODWT coeﬃcients by pyramid
algorithm again, but from high scale to low scale
Vj−1,t =
L−1X
l=0
hlWj,t+2j−1lmodN +
L−1X
l=0
glVj,t+2j−1lmodN , for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, (4.12)
while {Xt}˙N−1t=0 is regarded as {V0,t}N−1t=0 .
In addition, we can focus on one specific scale level and synthesize MODWT detail at
scale j, Dj, from the MODWT coeﬃcients {0, . . . ,0,Wj,0, . . . , 0}, or MODWT smooth
at scale J , SJ , from {0, . . . , 0,VJ}. Since MODWT filtering is a linear operator, it is
easy to have the so-called multiresolution analysis (MRA)
X =
JX
j=1
Dj + SJ . (4.13)
4The bold or calligraphic variables indicate the vectors of related series.
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4.2.3 Features of MODWT
Energy-Preserving Multi-Scale Decomposition
The half-energy condition and orthogonality condition for even shifts provide additional
features of MODWT over the general moving average and diﬀerencing method. The
above multi-scale decomposition via pyramid algorithm has a beneficial energy-preserving
property
kXk2 =
JX
j=1
kWjk2 + kVJk2, (4.14)
or
kXk2
N
− X¯2 = 1
N
JX
j=1
kWjk2 + (kVJk
2
N
− X¯2).
Note that wavelet coeﬃcients are mean zero, while the mean of scaling coeﬃcients is the
same as that of the original series. Therefore, equation (4.14) indicates that the variance
of the original series is just the sum of wavelet variances for MODWTwavelet and scaling
coeﬃcients at diﬀerent scales.
Spectral Interpretation
In the language of spectral analysis, the MODWT wavelet filter {hl}L−1l=0 belongs to high
pass filter focused on frequencies in the interval of [−2−1,−2−2] and [2−2, 2−1], while the
scaling filter {gl}L−1l=0 is a low pass filter for frequencies between −2−2 and 2−2. With τ j =
2j−1 denoting the scale at jth level, we know that the τ j scale wavelet coeﬃcients (Wj)
captures most energy with frequencies in the interval of [−2−j,−2−j−1] and [2−j, 2−j−1].
As a result, we can find the approximate relationship between wavelet variance and
spectral density SX(f) of the original series
var{Wj} ≈ 2
Z 2−j
2−j−1
SX(f)df (4.15)
The use of approximation is due to the existence of leakage for MODWT filters. In
application, there is no high (low) pass only discrete filter. Leakage is inevitable, more
or less.
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MODWT vs DWT
MODWT can be regarded as a modified version of discrete wavelet transform (DWT).
The DWT filters have unit energy, instead of half energy in the MODWT case. Hence
the DWT filter is simply
√
2 times the MODWT filters. To preserve the energy of the
original series, we choose every other of the MODWT wavelet and scaling coeﬃcients at
each step of the pyramid algorithm. This approach is called downsampling by two.
In DWT analysis, the energy of details is the same as that of wavelet coeﬃcients at
the same scale level,
kDjk2 = kWjk2, for j = 1, . . . , J . (4.16)
The cost is that the DWT analysis might be sensitive to circular shifts due to the down-
sampling approach. The discarded components by the downsampling approach could
contain diﬀerent information from the remainder. An illustrative example is provided by
Percival and Walden (2000, page 161 and 181). Moreover, as we will see later, MODWT
provides a larger sample size in the wavelet variance, covariance, and correlation analysis.
As a consequence, this paper focuses on MODWT.
4.2.4 Practical Considerations
Boundary-Aﬀected Coeﬃcients
Recall that the MODWT coeﬃcients are generated by circular convolution. The coeﬃ-
cients computed from both beginning and ending data are likely to be spurious. Percival
and Walden (2000) show that, if the length of filter is L, there are (2j − 1)(L − 1) co-
eﬃcients aﬀected for τ j-scale wavelet and scaling coeﬃcients, while (2j − 1)(L − 1) − 1
beginning and (2j − 1)(L− 1) ending components in τ j-scale details and smooths would
be aﬀected.
There is a noteworthy remark. After deleting boundary-aﬀected coeﬃcients, the
energy-preserving equation (4.14) does not hold any more. However, the simulations of
white noise and random walk series shows that the summation of wavelet variance and
the variance of scaling coeﬃcients still accounts for about 90-110% of the variance in the
original series.
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Choice of MODWT filters
There are two considerations about the filter choice: the type and the length. Percival
and Walden (2000, page 196) demonstrated the artifacts in some of the DWT filters,
but the problem is much mitigated in MODWT case. Daubechies least asymmetric
(LA) MODWT filters, which are also called as symlets, are among the popular choices,
because LA filters provide most accurate synchronization between wavelet coeﬃcients
and the original series.
The choice of filter’s length is based on the trade-oﬀ between leakage and the number
of boundary aﬀected coeﬃcients. If the length (L) is larger, the filters are much closer
to the ideal high (low) pass only filters. However, the number of boundary aﬀected
coeﬃcients will increase, reducing the size of unaﬀected coeﬃcients. In this paper, we
choose LA(8) filters.
4.2.5 Wavelet Variance, Covariance, and Correlation
Theoretically, the wavelet variance, ν2j,X , is just the variance of wavelet coeﬃcients at
scale τ j, as we have shown in equation (4.14). However, we know that the boundary-
aﬀected coeﬃcients could generate spurious results. Hence the estimator of a τ j-scale
wavelet variance is the variance estimator, νˆ2j,X(τ j), for the boundary-unaﬀected coef-
ficients conditional on mean zero.5 Assuming the true series of wavelet coeﬃcients at
scale τ j is a Gaussian stationary process with mean zero and a spectral density func-
tion (SDF) Sj, Percival and Walden (2000) provided the asymptotic distribution for the
wavelet variance estimator
νˆ2j,X(τ j)
asy∼N(ν2j,X ,
2Aj
Mj
), (4.17)
where Mj = N − (2j − 1)(L− 1) is the number of unaﬀected coeﬃcients, and
Aj =
Z 1/2
−1/2
S2j (f)df <∞.
5It is the so called biased variance estimator. Since the true mean of the series is known to be zero,
we can save one degree of freedom.
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In application, Aj is estimated by the sum of squared autocovariance sequence (ACVS).
We can construct confidence interval accordingly. Recognizing that the confidence in-
terval based on asymptotic normal distribution may contain negative values, Percival
and Walden (2000) also provided an asymptotic χ2 distribution, but it seems diﬃcult to
find the best choice of equivalent degrees of freedom. Serroukh et al (2000) relaxed the
Gaussian condition and proposed another estimator of wavelet variance, along with a cor-
responding asymptotic normal distribution, by employing multitaper spectrum analysis
with Slepian tapers.
As for a nonstationary series with its dth order diﬀerence strictly stationary (or d-
stationary for shorthand notation), Serroukh et al (2000) demonstrated that as long as
the length of the Daubechies filter (L) is larger than 2d, the series of MODWT wavelet
coeﬃcients is also strictly stationary at each scale level. If the d-stationarity only holds
locally, we can only this result at the corresponding time periods.
Analogously, Whitcher et al (1999, 2000) constructed wavelet covariance
γj,XY = cov{W(X)j ,W(Y)j }
and wavelet correlation ρj,XY based on the wavelet coeﬃcients. They demonstrated scale-
by-scale covariance decomposition similar to equation (4.14) for two stationary time series
X and Y
cov{X,Y} = cov{V(X)J ,V(Y)J }+
JX
j=1
γj,XY . (4.18)
The correlation is simply
ρj,XY =
γj,XY
νj,Xνj,Y
. (4.19)
The estimators are just the covariance and correlation of the boundary-unaﬀected wavelet
coeﬃcients. If the both wavelet coeﬃcients are Gaussian stationary process with square
integrable autospectra, Whitcher et al (2000) showed the
γˆj,XY
asy∼N(γj,XY ,
Vj
Mj
) (4.20)
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and
ρˆj,XY
asy∼N(ρj,XY,
Rj
Mj
) (4.21)
where
Vj =
Z 1/2
−1/2
Sj,X(f)Sj,Y(f)df +
Z 1/2
−1/2
S2j,XY(f)df .
We skip the tedious expression of Rj, which can be found in Whitcher et al (1999). More-
over, the confidence In application, Whitcher et al (2000) developed a cleaner asymptotic
distribution for tanh−1(ρˆj,XY) via Fisher’s z transformation
tanh−1(ρˆj,XY)
asy∼N(tanh−1(ρj,XY),
1
M˜j − 3
), (4.22)
where M˜j = d2−jN−(L−2)(1−2−j)e is a proxy for the number of independent samples,
and the operator de takes the integer part of the real number inside.
However, since M˜j is the number of DWT coeﬃcients and that of MODWT is close
to 2jM˜j, the confidence interval based on (4.22) is quite conservative for high scale levels.
In this paper, we also compute more aggressive confidence interbals based on the number
of MODWT Mj = N − (2j − 1)(L − 1), and report the results. The true confidence
interval should lie between the two approaches. As a part of our future research, we will
investigate which one is closer to the truth by simulations.
4.2.6 Investigation of Nonlinear Dependence
While correlation coeﬃcients can only detect linear dependence, it may not reveal the
entire dependence structure. As a result, we also calculate Kendall’s tau and Spearman’s
rho, two of the popular measure for nonlinear dependence.
According to Nelsen (1999), Kendall’s tau for the pared random variable (X,Y ) with
a realization of {(xi, yi)}ni=1 is defined as
τX,Y = Pr[(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) > 0]− Pr[(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y2) < 0] (4.23)
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while the estimator is
τˆX,Y =
2
n(n− 1){#[(xi − xj)(yi − yj) > 0]−#[(xi − xj)(yi − yj) < 0]}. (4.24)
Spearman’s rho is
ρX,Y = 3{Pr[(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y3) > 0]− Pr[(X1 −X2)(Y1 − Y3) < 0]}. (4.25)
While the number of computations is (n − 2)/3 times that of τˆ , it is burdensome to
calculate the estimator similar to equation (4.24). Nelsen (1999) shows that Spearman’s
rho is essentially the ”grade” correlation coeﬃcient
ρX,Y =
E[F (X)G(Y )]− E[F (X)]E[G(Y )]p
var[F (X)] var[G(Y )]
, (4.26)
where F (·) andG(·) are the cumulative density functions (CDF) forX and Y respectively.
Hence we can estimate ρX,Y with empirical CDFs. The results, which are qualitatively
similar to those based on correlation coeﬃcients, are listed in Table 4.3 at the end of this
chapter.6
4.2.7 Performance in Heuristic Examples
Since MODWT analysis is still a new tool, we simulate some examples to explore its
empirical performance. First, we construct a series with a single transitory shock and
another one with a single sustained shock. The lengths are both 4096, while the shocks
happen at 2049. The lengths are close to the size of our data set, and the impact from
deleting boundary aﬀected coeﬃcients is mitigated as well. We employ the LA(8) filter
to obtain wavelet coeﬃcients up to scale τ 6. In the transitory shock case,W1 accounts
for 50.34% of the variance, while V6 captures only 2.44% of it. By contrast, V6 of
sustained shock series captures 94.02% variance of the original series. Actually it is the
simplest regime switching series, which is non-stationary. Hence, V6 of sustained shock
6The nonlinear interdependence measures do not general similar results as correlation coeﬃcients in
all cases. Counter-examples can be found in Nelsen (1999).
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series is also nonstationary. In this regard, we focus on the composition of the variances
among wavelet coeﬃcients only. The results are listed in Table 4.1. Although leakage is
inevitable, it decays at a fast rate (about half to the adjacent scale).
Another pair of examples is Gaussian white noise and random walk. We generate both
series from the same set of random data drawn from the standard normal distribution. We
simulate twice to have a better idea about the truth, and also figure out the energy in the
corresponding spectral density given by equation (4.15). Note that the spectral density
function (SDF) for Gaussian white noise with variance one is Swn(f) = 1, and SDF for
the random walk we generate is Srw(f) = (1/4) sin−2(πf), where f ∈ [−1/2, 1/2]. The
results are given in Table 4.1. Actually, it is diﬃcult, if not impossible, to diﬀerentiate
white noise series from the series with single transitory shock, or random walk series from
the sustained shock series. We can interpret the phenomenon by the similar properties
of the shocks. Moreover, MODWT coeﬃcients seem to seize as much energy as their
counterparts in spectrum analysis, except for theW1 in the random walk case. It means
that the leakage of the LA(8) filter is negligible.
We also check the variance composition for the stock indices we have. The empirical
results suggest that the levels of (log) indices behave almost the same as the sustained
stock series or the random walk series, while the daily returns (i.e. the first diﬀerence of
the log indices) perform like transitory shock series. It suggests that the (log) indices are
close to the series with unit root.
By investigating a correlated bivariate stationary Gaussian series and a correspond-
ing Gaussian random walk series with a correlation coeﬃcient of 0.5,7 we find that the
performance of wavelet correlation estimator is quite reasonable. The true correlation
coeﬃcient lies within all of the 95% confidence intervals, while the wavelet correlations
are alike for stationary Gaussian series and Gaussian random walk series generated by
the same set of random data. In fact, we repeat it three times, and the wavelet corre-
lation estimator at the first scale level ranges from 0.4573 to 0.5469, while all the 95%
confidence intervals are contained in [0.3140, 0.6579]. The confidence intervals become
7The correlated series are generated from two standard normal series, say X and Y . Let A = X+rY ,
and B = X − rY . We have var(A) = var(B) = 1 + r2, and cov(A,B) = 1− r2. Hence ρA,B =
1− r2
1 + r2
.
Given the level of the correlation coeﬃcient, we can find the value of r to construct two correlated series.
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Series W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6
Transitory Shocks
Single Transitory Shock 50.42% 25.30% 12.74% 6.46% 3.32% 1.76%
White Noise (Median) 51.01% 25.72% 12.70% 6.26% 3.23% 1.56%
10 percentile 49.02% 24.85% 12.37% 5.70% 2.73% 1.38%
90 percentile 51.70% 26.22% 13.52% 6.81% 3.34% 2.07%
Spectral Approximation 50.79% 25.40% 12.70% 6.35% 3.17% 1.59%
Sustained Shocks
Single Sustained Shock 2.30% 3.23% 6.01% 11.97% 24.51% 51.98%
Random Walk (Median) 2.61% 3.63% 6.75% 12.80% 25.90% 49.50%
10 percentile 2.10% 3.06% 5.52% 10.95% 23.70% 44.72%
90 percentile 2.87% 4.04% 7.50% 14.62% 26.95% 53.86%
Spectral Approximation 2.45% 3.47% 6.41% 12.58% 25.05% 50.03%
Table 4.1: Energy Composition for Simulated Series
larger at higher scale level, and the estimator’s performance is getting worse accordingly.
4.3 Empirical Results
We focus on the stock markets in US, Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Mainland China.
The physical trades are active among these economies. These economies also have some
similarity in sectoral structures, in cultures as well as in psychological features. On the
other hand, these markets have diﬀerent degree of global integration, which is believed to
be important in comovements of international stock markets. Japanese and Hong Kong
markets are open and highly integrated with other advanced markets, while Taiwan stock
market can be regarded as semi-open due to its qualified foreign institutional investors
(QFII) regulation, which sets an upper limits for the total amount of investments andthe
proportion of shares in a specific firm. The stock markets in Mainland China are virtually
closed to foreigners.
We investigate two types of stock market comovements. Firstly, we focus on the stock
markets with the same economy, in an eﬀort to find Long-term comovements driven by
fundamentals. Secondly, we consider to what extent the price changes in the US markets
would aﬀect the Eastern Asian markets in the subsequent trading periods.
106
Series W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6
Level of Indices
NASDAQ 2.32% 3.59% 6.66% 9.75% 20.89% 56.79%
S&P500 3.14% 4.80% 8.78% 13.47% 28.82% 40.99%
Nikkei (Japan) 3.05% 4.14% 7.30% 12.64% 24.21% 48.66%
Hang Seng (Hong Kong) 2.05% 2.80% 5.52% 10.01% 22.08% 57.53%
TWII (Taiwan) 1.96% 2.84% 6.72% 10.83% 25.32% 52.33%
SSEC (Shanghai) 2.20% 3.16% 6.80% 16.09% 27.74% 44.01%
SZSC1 (Shenzhen) 1.91% 2.72% 5.78% 13.43% 24.91% 51.25%
Daily Returns
NASDAQ 48.95% 26.82% 14.36% 5.61% 2.54% 1.70%
S&P500 49.42% 26.85% 14.27% 5.51% 2.87% 1.07%
Nikkei (Japan) 51.87% 26.45% 12.38% 5.41% 2.55% 1.34%
Hang Seng (Hong Kong) 50.98% 24.02% 13.83% 5.81% 3.50% 1.86%
TWII (Taiwan) 48.74% 23.20% 15.74% 6.72% 3.74% 1.86%
SSEC (Shanghai) 48.21% 24.93% 12.90% 8.70% 3.71% 1.54%
SZSC1 (Shenzhen) 48.36% 24.49% 12.97% 8.40% 3.77% 2.02%
Table 4.2: Energy Composition of Stock Indices
Observe that the trading time of Eastern Asian markets are close to each other, while
none of them share the same trading time with the US markets. The news form the US
markets arrives to the Eastern Asian markets almost the same time. Hence the above
Eastern Asian economies provide a good set of samples for the comovement study on
international markets.
The sources and manipulations of data are explained in Appendix. Actually, we have
to delete some data to match the trading days. Moreover, we use the US indices in the
preceding days to study the contagion from US markets to other markets.8
4.3.1 Stock Markets in the Same Economy
Before we go internationally, we will study the domestic markets first. In order to have
some idea about the domestic market comovements in general, we study two advanced
stock markets in the US, and two closed emerging markets in Mainland China.
The first finding is that the wavelet correlation coeﬃcients do vary over time scales.
We can easily find two non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals. This feature is shared
8One of the next scheduled tasks is to check the feedbacks from other markets to US markets.
Empirical studies by other economists suggest that the feedback would be quite weak.
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by all the wavelet correlation analysis we have conducted on the above stock markets.
While it is diﬃcult to obtain similar results, the employment of wavelet analysis does
provide special information from the time series.
Secondly, the wavelet correlation for domestic markets seems to increase over the
length of time scales. In the case of US markets from February 5, 1971 to July 31,
2003 (Figure 4.1a), the wavelet correlations are 0.7537 and 0.7913 at the first two scale
levels, while that of the 8th level record as high as 0.9015. Note that the kth scale
level focuses mainly on changes over 2k days in the LA(8) case. The 8th level wavelet
coeﬃcients approximately capture the changes of annual returns, since the number of
trading days lies between 230 and 250 in most stock markets. Hence the comovements
of NASDAQ and S&P500 are stronger in the long run than in the short run. It could
be attributed to the announcement of macroeconomic indicators and/or the learning
about sectoral performance from quarterly-reported corporate earnings. We find similar
results for Shanghai and Shenzhen stock markets (June 1, 1992 to July 31, 2003) in
Mainland China, where the wavelet correlations are above 0.9 for the 6th (quarterly) and
7th (semiannual) scale levels, and below 0.83 otherwise (Figure 4.2a, 4.2b).
In contrast, the long-term correlations are significantly lower than their short-run
counterparts for NASDAQ and S&P500 from 1992 to 2003 (Figure 4.1b). It makes sense
if we consider the sectoral structure of the two markets. In 1990’s, more and more IT and
internet companies are listed in NASDAQ, making its share of companies in traditional
sectors much lower than that of S&P500. The diﬀerent levels of exposure to sectoral
shocks oﬀset some of the synchronization driven by the macroeconomic environment.
Observe that the corporate earnings are reported quarterly, which is in line with the dive
of wavelet correlation at the 6th level.
In both cases of domestic comovements, short-run correlations are still above 0.6,
which supports common empirical results in the study of excess comovements over the
fundamentals-driven prices. The driving forces may include the infection of expectation
errors and the common signaling noises. Some of the short-term comovements are driven
by the arrival of common signals. Moreover, since many investors (institutional and
individual) invest in both domestic markets, the learning process of signals is the same
for them before they make decision on either market, so is the expectation error generated
108
from the learning. Psychological factors could be nested in the learning process. So far
we fail to disentangle the learning errors from the signaling noises. However, the study
on international stock market comovements sheds some light on this issue.
4.3.2 International Comovements
As mentioned above, we investigate the impact from US market performance to Eastern
Asian markets. Now the signaling noises are under reasonable control thanks to the
non-overlapping trading time and similar sectoral structures in Japan and Great China
markets.
With no surprise, the correlation increases in the degree of global integration, with the
Chinese mainland markets uncorrelated with most of the other markets. A market with
higher degree of global integration implies larger proportions of multi-national investors,
and hence more sensitive to US markets due to our within-group infection conjecture.
However, the cross-scale behaviors of wavelet correlations suggest more complexity.
As shown in Figure 4.3 and 4.4, Hong Kong and Japanese markets are more sensitive
to US market changes at the fifth (approximately 1.5 month) and sixth (quarterly) scale
than either the seventh (semiannual) scale or the first few ones. For Taiwan market, the
third (8 days, or 1.6 week) and fourth (16 days) scales provide the highest correlation
(Figure 4.5). The drop of correlation coeﬃcients at seventh (semiannual) scale excludes
the fundamental factors as the only driving forces of comovements at shorter time scales.
However, we also find low correlation at first few scale levels. The reason may lie in
the review and decision mechanism within multi-national institutional investors. The
execution group may focus more on local events, while the decision-making committee
would review the signals more globally on a monthly or quarterly basis.
The interaction among Japanese, Hong Kong and Taiwan markets, illustrated in
Figure 4.8, are of the same sizes as the sensitivity of Taiwan market to US markets.
All the correlations are below 0.4 except for two cases. The seventh-scale (semiannual)
correlation between Japanese and Taiwanmarkets is 0.5195, while Hong Kong and Taiwan
markets comove with a correlation of 0.5432 at the sixth level (quarterly).
Chinese Mainland markets are quite closed, so their interactions with other markets
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are modest. With most wavelet correlations very small (between -0.2 to 0.2), we fail to
reject the hypothesis of zero correlation at 95% level in most cases (Figure 4.6, 4.7,.4.9,
4.10, 4.11). However, there do exist two exceptions. One is the seventh-level (semian-
nual) correlations between Mainland markets and Taiwan market at 0.2636 and 0.3188,
respectively (Figure 4.11). The other is the comovement at the seventh level (semian-
nually, again) between Chinese Mainland markets and Japanese Nikkei Index at 0.2027
and 0.2267 respectively (Figure 4.9). Actually, in the subsequent subsection, we show
that neither case is robust under the conservative approach.
Owing to the closedness of Chinese mainlandmarkets, there is no institutional investor
across the Taiwan Strait. Hence, it could only be driven by fundamental factors, such as
similar structure of their exports to US. This finding sheds some lights on the explanation
for the other anomalies within the Eastern Asian markets.
Compared with institutional investors, individual investors trading in two markets
are much less influential. We can look at the results between Chinese Mainland markets
and Hang Seng Index. Actually, Shenzhen is a city adjacent to Hong Kong, and there
are several individual investors trading on both markets. However, the stock market
there is only more sensitive than Shanghai market at the first level (less than 2 days),
with a correlation at 0.0921 against 0.0335. The diﬀerence is marginally significant since
the corresponding 95% confidence intervals overlap each other, but none contains both
estimated values.
4.3.3 Robustness under the Conservative Approach
We also compute the confidence intervals proposed by Whitcher et al (2000), and find
that most of our findings are still robust. By comparing the results, we find 120 corre-
lations coeﬃcients, out of 162, are significant from zero under both approaches. For the
remaining, only 9 cases in the first four scale levels, while the infected correlation coeﬃ-
cients are all below 0.08. In contrast, their counterparts in the fifth, sixth and seventh
scale level account for 9, 14, and 10 cases respetively, with highest infected correlation
coeﬃcients at 0.1984, 0.3060, and 0.4539. In addition, we find 31 infected case associ-
ated with Chinese Mainland markets. According to the conservative approach, Chinese
110
Mainland market has only one significant interaction with the others, which is between
Shenzhen and Hong Kong at the first level. This is in line with the closedness of these
markets.
4.4 Conclusion
In this paper, we investigate wavelet correlations of domestic and international stock mar-
kets, as well as two measures of nonlinear dependence. Not surprisingly, fundamentals
(factors with sustained eﬀects) play an important role in the domestic market comove-
ments given similar sectoral structure for the listing companies. On the other hand, we
do find significant short-run comovements, which are not incorporated in the prevail-
ing asset pricing models. Monthly and quarterly comovements among open markets are
relatively more significant. This implies that the investors with monthly or quarterly
adjustment of their portfolios are more sensitive to the preceding performance in the US
markets. Our results suggest that the degree of stock market comovements is increasing
in the openness of the markets.9
One concern in out study is the nonstationarity in daily returns. Although the LA(8)
filter guarantees the wavelet coeﬃcients are all mean zero, it fails to remove the het-
eroscedasticity in the data. Possible approaches to deal with this issue include investi-
gating some subperiods or some proxies of daily correlation.
Tail dependence is another interesting feature for stock market comovements. It
focuses on the level of contagion when one of the markets experiences a sharp drop
or a big jump. We expect that the tail dependence would also diﬀer across the time
scales. This exercise, along with further investigation of confidence intervals for wavelet
correlations and other measure of dependence, is among our future research.
9As mentioned above, the study on the comovements between Chinese B-share markets with other
Greater Chinese counterparts would shed more light on the relationship between market openness and
the level of comovements. So far the results are too preliminary to report, but it would be completed
soon.
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Appendix
The Source of the Data
Basically the stock indices are collected from Yahoo! Finance. The symbols of the
indices we use in this paper are listed in Table 4.3.
The earlier NASDAQ and S&P500 indices are collected from www.economagic.com,
and the stock indices for Taiwan, Shanghai, and Shenzhen stock exchanges in the early
1990’s are obtained from their websites: www.tse.com.tw, www.sse.com.cn and www.sse.org.cn,
respectively.
Manipulations of the Data
There are 8202 stock index data for NASDAQ and S&P500 from February 5, 1971 to
July 31, 2003, and 2698 for Chinese Mainland markets (Shanghai and Shenzhen) from
June 1, 1992 to July 31, 2003. These data are used to obtain Figure 1a and 2a.
Since we have diﬀerent holidays in there markets, we have to delete the unmatched
trading dates. After this operation, we have 2330 data for all the stock indices. The
remaining figures are computed based on these adjusted data. Of course it will distort
the result to some extent. Nonetheless we can find that the deletion of the unmatched
dates does not change much of the results by comparing Figure 2a and 2b.
As per Percival and Walden (2000), we also remove the boundary aﬀected wavelet
coeﬃcients. The numbers of the removed ones are 7, 21, 49, 105, 217, 441, 889, and
1785, respectively from the first to eighth scale level. To obtain more than 1000 data
in each wavelet coeﬃcient series, we generate the wavelet coeﬃcients up to the seventh
level, except for Figure 1a, where we have 8202 data points.
In this paper we use the level data to obtain the results, which is unlike the usual
treatment for unit root series. Discussion is provided in the subsequent subsection.
Level or Diﬀerenced Data
There is an issue about the choice of level data or the diﬀerenced data (daily returns).
We usually diﬀerence the series with unit root before further study. However, it is
not necessary for wavelet analysis, since the wavelet filters do the job by its general
diﬀerencing operations.
112
Location of Stock Exchange Stock Index Yahoo Symbol
New York, US NASDAQ ^IXIC
New York, US S&P500 ^SPC, or ^GSPC
Tokyo, Japan Nikkei 225 Index ^N225
Hong Kong Hang Seng Index ^HSI
Taipei, Taiwan Taiwan Weighted Index ^TWII
Shanghai, P. R. China SSE Composite Index ^SSEC
Shenzhen, P. R. China SZSE Composite Subindex ^SZSC1
Table 4.3: List of Symbols in Yahoo! Finance
With some algebraic manipulation, equation (4.10) and (4.11) can be rewritten as
Wj,t = (
L−1X
l=0
hlB2
j−1l)Vj−1,t = [
L−2X
l=0
ηlB
2j−1l](1−B2j−1)Vj−1,t, (A1)
Vj,t = (
L−1X
l=0
glB2
j−1l)Vj−1,t = [
L−2X
l=0
ηl(−B2
j−1
)l](1 +B2
j−1
)Vj−1,t, (A2)
for t = 0, . . . , N − 1, and j = 1, 2, . . . , J , where B is the lag operator, and
ηl =
lX
k=0
hk. (A3)
Note that the weights in (A1) have a sum of zero, the wavelet filter at jth level (gen-
erally) diﬀerences the first-order diﬀerence of lower level scaling coeﬃcients with a scale
of 2j−1. Analogously, the scaling coeﬃcients are the general moving average of the sum
of ”adjacent”10 lower level scaling coeﬃcients. Observe that the diﬀerencing scale is the
same as the moving average scale in the lower level scaling coeﬃcients, so the wavelet
coeﬃcients are stationary for the unit root series. Hence, there is no need to diﬀerence
the series before wavelet analysis. The only consideration for the choice between level
and diﬀerenced data is just the economic interpretation of the corresponding wavelet
coeﬃcients.
10The ”adjacent” scaling coeﬃcients means that the set of covered data are just near each other, but
there is no common data between them. In fact, this pair of scaling coeﬃcients is adjacent in the DWT
scenario.
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In the LA(8) case, η3 (-0.2491) and η4 (0.3193) are bigger in size than others. Hence,
we approximate the wavelet coeﬃcients:
W1,t ≈ (0.3193B − 0.2419)B3(1−B)Xt,
W2,t ≈ (0.412 7B + 0.474 2B2 + 0.180 4B3 + 0.1190)
×(0.5651B − 0.4918)B9(1−B2).
Observe that W1,t is roughly proportional to the negative of the changes in daily return,
andW2,t is approximately the moving average of changes in two-day return. If we use the
diﬀerenced data, the wavelet coeﬃcients are simply the first diﬀerence of their counterpart
from level data. Now the interpretation is less straightforward.
Nonetheless, the correlations would be the same for both cases, if the related pair
wavelet coeﬃcients form a serially uncorrelated bivariate sequence with covariance sta-
tionarity and mean 0. The justification comes from the fact that
cov(xt − xt−1, yt − yt−1) = Extyt −Ext−1yt − Extyt−1 +Ext−1yt−1 = 2 cov(xt, yt).
and analogous results for the variances. Hence we should find identical correlation coef-
ficients for the two cases. Note that it is only a suﬃcient condition.
In our study, the wavelet correlations are essentially unchanged in 91 out of 162 cases
as per our 10% change criterion. For the remaining 70 cases, 40 are associated with
correlation coeﬃcients insignificant from zero, 20 from low correlation (<0.25) cases,
mostly associated with the two Chinese Mainland markets. It seems that Japanese and
Taiwan markets are more vulnerable because all the 10 significant cases are related with
at least one of them. The immediate implication is that the corresponding wavelet
coeﬃcients are serially correlated to some extent.
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Table 4.4: Wavelet Correlation and other Measures of  
Interdependence for the Target Stock Markets 
 
NASDAQ and S&P500 
(02/05/1971-07/31/2003) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 W8 
Correlation  0.7537 0.7913 0.8167 0.8361 0.8554 0.8525 0.8788 0.9015 
Lower bound 0.7402 0.7796 0.8063 0.8267 0.8469 0.8439 0.8717 0.8956 
Upper bound 0.7666 0.8025 0.8267 0.8451 0.8634 0.8606 0.8856 0.9071 
Kendall’s tau 0.6009 0.6283 0.6589 0.6713 0.6858 0.6843 0.7218 0.7257 
Spearman’s rho 0.7874 0.8168 0.8432 0.8520 0.8614 0.8569 0.8909 0.8874 
 
 
NASDAQ and S&P500  
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.8271 0.8268 0.8337 0.8299 0.7964 0.7229 0.7378 
Lower bound 0.8138 0.8135 0.8207 0.8165 0.7802 0.7007 0.7133 
Upper bound 0.8395 0.8393 0.8458 0.8424 0.8115 0.7438 0.7605 
Kendall’s tau 0.6251 0.6387 0.6469 0.6291 0.6385 0.5629 0.5558 
Spearman’s rho 0.8041 0.8192 0.8288 0.8100 0.8084 0.7355 0.7526 
Note: For the wavelet correlations we provide the lower and upper bounds of the 95% 
confidence interval. 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
Chinese Mainland Markets 
(Shanghai SSEC and Shenzhen SZSC1) 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003)  
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.6660  0.7119  0.7517 0.8103  0.7984 0.9013 0.9440 
Lower bound 0.6352  0.6845 0.7275 0.7911  0.7782 0.8907 0.9379 
Upper bound 0.6947  0.7372 0.7740 0.8279  0.8170 0.9108 0.9495 
Kendall’s tau 0.5721  0.5627 0.6128 0.6543  0.6898 0.6808 0.8156 
Spearman’s rho 0.7108  0.7123 0.7687 0.8200  0.8574 0.8529 0.9527 
 
 
Chinese Mainland Markets 
(Shanghai SSEC and Shenzhen SZSC1) 
 (06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.7033  0.6799 0.7608 0.7989  0.8216 0.9076 0.9345 
Lower bound 0.6821  0.6573 0.7429 0.7833  0.8072 0.8993 0.9276 
Upper bound 0.7233  0.7012 0.7775 0.8134  0.8349 0.9152 0.9407 
Kendall’s tau 0.5830  0.5638 0.6234 0.6693  0.6784 0.7245 0.7977 
Spearman’s rho 0.7258  0.7109 0.7847 0.8284  0.8471 0.8907 0.9429 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
NASDAQ and Japan Nikkei 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.2734  0.3750 0.4222 0.3843  0.4321 0.4625 0.2604 
Lower bound 0.2353  0.3394 0.3878 0.3483  0.3968 0.4263 0.2116  
Upper bound 0.3106  0.4095 0.4553 0.4191  0.4661 0.4972 0.3079 
Kendall’s tau 0.1712  0.2417 0.2738 0.2522  0.3021 0.2950 0.1835 
Spearman’s rho 0.2509  0.3522 0.3985 0.3691  0.4349 0.4283 0.2723 
 
 
S&P500 and Japan Nikkei 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.3059  0.3809 0.4552 0.4496  0.4705 0.4380 0.2791 
Lower bound 0.2685  0.3455 0.4221 0.4158  0.4366 0.4008 0.2308 
Upper bound 0.3423  0.4153 0.4872 0.4821  0.5030 0.4737 0.3261 
Kendall’s tau 0.1727  0.2446 0.3183 0.3244  0.3264 0.2900 0.1997 
Spearman’s rho 0.2528  0.3562 0.4575 0.4635  0.4753 0.4156 0.2861 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
NASDAQ and Hong Kong HSI 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.3255  0.3961 0.4678 0.4072  0.5839 0.5293 0.4539 
Lower bound 0.2886  0.3611  0.4351 0.3719  0.5551 0.4961 0.4119  
Upper bound 0.3614  0.4299 0.4992 0.4413  0.6113  0.5610 0.4940 
Kendall’s tau 0.2002  0.2665 0.3345 0.3077  0.4190 0.3829 0.3354 
Spearman’s rho 0.2923  0.3866 0.4844 0.4421  0.5928 0.5348 0.4954 
 
 
S&P500 and Hong Kong HSI 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.3947  0.4549 0.5015 0.4824  0.5945 0.6009 0.5997 
Lower bound 0.3598  0.4219 0.4702 0.4499  0.5662 0.5712 0.5656 
Upper bound 0.4285  0.4866 0.5316 0.5137  0.6214 0.6289 0.6318 
Kendall’s tau 0.2488  0.3132 0.3666 0.3522  0.4344 0.4622 0.4588 
Spearman’s rho 0.3589  0.4495 0.5241 0.5015  0.6128 0.6443 0.6305 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
NASDAQ and Taiwan TWII 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.1273  0.3211  0.3732 0.3902  0.1984 0.3060 0.0233 
Lower bound 0.0871  0.2840 0.3374 0.3544  0.1571 0.2645 -0.0284 
Upper bound 0.1671  0.3572 0.4080 0.4249  0.2390 0.3463 0.0748 
Kendall’s tau 0.0790  0.2095 0.2418 0.2027  0.0958 0.2222 0.0005 
Spearman’s rho 0.1162  0.3047 0.3515 0.2951  0.1403 0.3295 0.0034 
 
 
S&P500 and Taiwan TWII 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.1721  0.2824 0.3348 0.3749  0.2882 0.2821 0.1732 
Lower bound 0.1323  0.2444 0.2979 0.3386  0.2486 0.2401 0.1227 
Upper bound 0.2113  0.3195 0.3708 0.4100  0.3268 0.3231 0.2229 
Kendall’s tau 0.1095  0.1796 0.2134 0.2023  0.1751 0.2113 0.1072 
Spearman’s rho 0.1614  0.2606 0.3121 0.2959  0.2585 0.3151 0.1671 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
NASDAQ and Shanghai SSEC 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0477  -0.0059 0.0334 -0.0032  0.0048 0.1277 -0.1436 
Lower bound 0.0071  -0.0467 -0.0076 -0.0447  -0.0378 0.0831 -0.1938 
Upper bound 0.0882  0.0349 0.0744 0.0384  0.0474 0.1718 -0.0926 
Kendall’s tau 0.0423  -0.0176 0.0323 -0.0135  -0.0093 0.0956 -0.0888 
Spearman’s rho 0.0649  -0.0290 0.0513 -0.0199  -0.0166 0.1407 -0.1334 
 
 
S&P500 and Shanghai SSEC 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0456  -0.0219 -0.0073 -0.0386  0.0056 0.0907 -0.0738 
Lower bound 0.0049  -0.0626 -0.0483 -0.0801  -0.0371 0.0458 -0.1250 
Upper bound 0.0861  0.0189 0.0337 0.0029  0.0482 0.1353 -0.0223 
Kendall’s tau 0.0448  -0.0159 -0.0114 -0.0536  -0.0244 0.0672 -0.0628 
Spearman’s rho 0.0685  -0.0248 -0.0169 -0.0843  -0.0421 0.1021 -0.0962 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
NASDAQ and Shenzhen SZSC1 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0561  0.0166 0.0528 -0.0127  0.0451 0.1401 -0.1930 
Lower bound 0.0155  -0.0242 0.0117  -0.0543  0.0024 0.0956 -0.2423 
Upper bound 0.0966  0.0573 0.0936 0.0288  0.0876 0.1840 -0.1428 
Kendall’s tau 0.0394  0.0048 0.0351 -0.0206  0.0277 0.1100 -0.1360 
Spearman’s rho 0.0598  0.0070 0.0532 -0.0325  0.0422 0.1625 -0.2054 
 
S&P500 and Shenzhen SZSC1 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0498  -0.0182 -0.0304 -0.0513  0.0543 0.0658 -0.1798 
Lower bound 0.0091  -0.0589 -0.0713 -0.0927  0.0117  0.0208 -0.2293 
Upper bound 0.0903  0.0226 0.0107 -0.0098  0.0967 0.1106 -0.1293 
Kendall’s tau 0.0371  -0.0126 -0.0283 -0.0535  0.0161 0.0605 -0.1394 
Spearman’s rho 0.0565  -0.0196 -0.0431 -0.0824  0.0214 0.0942 -0.2093 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
Japan Nikkei and Hong Kong HSI 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.3690  0.3843 0.3528 0.3011  0.3651 0.2534 0.3354 
Lower bound 0.3334  0.3489 0.3163 0.2629  0.3275 0.2107 0.2888 
Upper bound 0.4036  0.4185 0.3882 0.3385  0.4014 0.2951 0.3805 
Kendall’s tau 0.2294  0.2650 0.2481 0.2054  0.2467 0.1736 0.2334 
Spearman’s rho 0.3319  0.3836 0.3594 0.3004  0.3630 0.2557 0.3450 
Japan Nikkei and Taiwan TWII 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.1503  0.2531 0.2800 0.3396  0.2987 0.1854 0.5195 
Lower bound 0.1103  0.2145 0.2417 0.3023  0.2593 0.1414 0.4807 
Upper bound 0.1898  0.2909 0.3174 0.3759  0.3370 0.2286 0.5562 
Kendall’s tau 0.1016  0.1623 0.1552 0.1982  0.1917 0.1501 0.3893 
Spearman’s rho 0.1494  0.2378 0.2295 0.2917  0.2851 0.2234 0.5659 
Hong Kong HSI and Taiwan Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.2432  0.2660 0.3496 0.3759  0.3666 0.5432 0.3366 
Lower bound 0.2046  0.2277 0.3130 0.3396  0.3291 0.5106 0.2900 
Upper bound 0.2811  0.3035 0.3851 0.4110  0.4030 0.5743 0.3816 
Kendall’s tau 0.1362  0.1768 0.2068 0.2513  0.2422 0.3436 0.1932 
Spearman’s rho 0.1997  0.2592 0.3034 0.3667  0.3491 0.4872 0.2876 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
Japan Nikkei and Shanghai SSEC 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0320  0.0138 0.0784 0.0172  0.0881 0.0954 0.2027 
Lower bound -0.0087 -0.0270 0.0375 -0.0244  0.0456 0.0506 0.1527 
Upper bound 0.0726  0.0545 0.1191  0.0587  0.1302 0.1399 0.2517 
Kendall’s tau 0.0046  0.0107 0.0472 0.0006  0.0459 0.1076 0.1565 
Spearman’s rho 0.0067  0.0158 0.0708 0.0011  0.0695 0.1561 0.2316 
 
 
Japan Nikkei and Shenzhen SZSC1 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0402  0.0373 0.0556 -0.0142  0.1325 0.1855 0.2267 
Lower bound -0.0005 -0.0035 0.0146 -0.0557  0.0904 0.1416 0.1771 
Upper bound 0.0807  0.0780 0.0964 0.0274  0.1742 0.2287 0.2751 
Kendall’s tau 0.0179  0.0310 0.0380 -0.0091  0.0431 0.1329 0.1933 
Spearman’s rho 0.0265  0.0475 0.0576 -0.0127  0.0640 0.2004 0.2889 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
Hong Kong HSI and Shanghai SSEC 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0335  0.0340 0.0322 -0.0832  0.0664 0.1798 -0.0054 
Lower bound -0.0071 -0.0068 -0.0088 -0.1243  0.0238 0.1358 -0.0571 
Upper bound 0.0741  0.0747 0.0732 -0.0417  0.1088 0.2231 0.0462 
Kendall’s tau 0.0419  0.0329 0.0487 -0.0406  0.0261 0.1198 -0.0260 
Spearman’s rho 0.0628  0.0501 0.0724 -0.0606  0.0365 0.1803 -0.0364 
 
 
Hong Kong HSI and Shenzhen SZSC1 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0921  0.0369 0.0648 -0.0148  0.0903 0.1024 -0.0886 
Lower bound 0.0516  -0.0039 0.0239 -0.0563  0.0478 0.0575 -0.1396 
Upper bound 0.1323  0.0776 0.1056 0.0267  0.1324 0.1468 -0.0371 
Kendall’s tau 0.0468  0.0362 0.0393 -0.0068  0.0535 0.0714 -0.0673 
Spearman’s rho 0.0703  0.0548 0.0591 -0.0096  0.0833 0.1005 -0.0933 
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Table 4.4 (continued) 
 
Taiwan TWII and Shanghai SSEC 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0295  -0.0097 -0.0417 0.0262  0.0639 0.0670 0.2636 
Lower bound -0.0111 -0.0505 -0.0826 -0.0154  0.0214 0.0220 0.2149 
Upper bound 0.0701  0.0311  -0.0007 0.0677  0.1063 0.1118 0.3110  
Kendall’s tau 0.0244  0.0010 -0.0230 0.0200  0.0969 0.0470 0.1789 
Spearman’s rho 0.0364  0.0011  -0.0349 0.0309  0.1456 0.0698 0.2862 
 
 
Taiwan TWII and Shenzhen Markets SZSC1 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
 W1 W2 W3 W4 W5 W6 W7 
Correlation  0.0458  0.0396 -0.0063 0.0322  0.1425 0.0967 0.3182 
Lower bound 0.0052  -0.0012 -0.0474 -0.0094  0.1005 0.0518 0.2710 
Upper bound 0.0864  0.0802 0.0347 0.0736  0.1840 0.1411 0.3638 
Kendall’s tau 0.0283  0.0302 -0.0135 0.0140  0.0980 0.0685 0.2198 
Spearman’s rho 0.0423  0.0457 -0.0210 0.0209  0.1471 0.1016 0.3397 
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Figure 4.1a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and S&P500 
(02/05/1971-07/31/2003) 
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Figure 4.1b: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and S&P500  
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.2a: Wavelet Correlation for Chinese Mainland Markets 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003) 
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Figure 4.2b: Wavelet Correlation for Chinese Mainland Markets 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.3a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and Nikkei 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.3b: Wavelet Correlation for S&P500 and Nikkei 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.4a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and Hang Seng 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.4b: Wavelet Correlation for S&P500 and Hang Seng 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.5a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and Taiwan Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.5b: Wavelet Correlation for S&P500 and Taiwan Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.6a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and Shanghai Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.6b: Wavelet Correlation for S&P500 and Shanghai Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.7a: Wavelet Correlation for NASDAQ and Shenzhen Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.7b: Wavelet Correlation for S&P500 and Shenzhen Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.8a: Wavelet Correlation for Nikkei and Hang Seng 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.8b: Wavelet Correlation for Nikkei and Taiwan Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.8c: Wavelet Correlation for Hong Kong and Taiwan Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.9a: Wavelet Correlation for Nikkei and Shanghai Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.9b: Wavelet Correlation for Nikkei and Shenzhen Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.10a: Wavelet Correlation for Hang Seng and Shanghai Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.10b: Wavelet Correlation for Hang Seng and Shenzhen Market 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.11a: Wavelet Correlation for Taiwan and Shanghai Markets 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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Figure 4.11b: Wavelet Correlation for Taiwan and Shenzhen Markets 
(06/01/1992-07/31/2003, unmatched dates deleted) 
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